The Role of Unemployment and Job Change when Estimating the Returns to Migration by Emmler, Julian & Fitzenberger, Bernd
The Role of Unemployment and Job Change
when Estimating the Returns to Migration
Julian Emmler (HU Berlin)
Bernd Fitzenberger (HU Berlin)
Discussion Paper No. 223
December 18, 2019
Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 | www.rationality-and-competition.de
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München | Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Spokesperson: Prof. Dr. Klaus M. Schmidt, University of Munich, 80539 Munich, Germany
+49 (89) 2180 3405 | info@rationality-and-competition.de
The role of unemployment and job change
when estimating the returns to migration⇤
Julian Emmler, Bernd Fitzenberger
December 18, 2019
Abstract
Estimating the returns to migration from East to West Germany, this paper
focuses on pre-migration employment dynamics, earnings uncertainty, and job
change in the source region. Migrants are found to be negatively selected with
respect to labor market outcomes, with a large drop in earnings and employment
during the last few months before migration. We find sizeable positive earnings
and employment gains of migration both in comparison to staying or job change.
The size of the gains varies considerably with pre-migration earnings and with
the counterfactual considered. Future migrants have worse expectations for their
labor market prospects in the East and migrants show a greater openness to
mobility.
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1 Introduction
Key drivers of individual migration decisions are the economic returns to migration and
the costs of migration. In many settings with high migration returns and low apparent
migration costs, individuals nevertheless do not migrate in large numbers. We estimate
the causal returns to migration in such a setting, namely migration from East to West
Germany a few years after the immediate surge in migration between 1989 and 1991
following German reunification.1 While a large part of the literature focusses on how
the returns to skill and the uncertainty about labor market outcomes in the destination
region a↵ect migration (compare Borjas (1987) and related studies), this paper considers
di↵erent counterfactual outcomes in the source region while scrutinizing the dynamic
selection of migrants before migration.
As the core of the paper, we estimate average causal e↵ects of migration for migrants
both on employment and earnings, while accounting for the strong dip in employment
and earnings during the last months before migration. Average returns to migration
prove positive for all groups. The size of the returns crucially depends upon whether
one considers staying or job change in the source region as counterfactual. Additionally,
returns to migration strongly depend on the employment status and on the earnings
level right before migration. Since average returns to migration are high for most
groups, we also analyze moving costs as obstacles to migration. Our analysis shows
that before migration, migrants do di↵er substantially from non-migrants with respect
to non-monetary moving costs, namely regarding expectations about their economic
future and their attitudes towards mobility.
For several reasons, migration from East to West Germany in the mid and late 1990s
is an ideal setting for our empirical analysis. First, due to the long separation, the East
and West German economies di↵ered strongly with much better labor market chances
1Annual migration peaked at almost 400 thousand individuals in 1989 and 1990 (Burda and Hunt,
2001). However, gross migration quickly fell below 200 thousand from 1992 onward until 1999, and
net migration was close to zero in the mid and late 1990s, despite a substantial remaining gap in
labor market chances between West and East Germany and despite the absence of legal restrictions or
language/cultural di↵erences (Hunt (2006), Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln et al. (2010)).
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in West Germany even though the two regions experienced some economic convergence
in the years after reunification (Burda and Hunt (2001), Hunt (2006)). At the same
time, di↵erences in institutions, language or culture, which could be obstacles to mi-
gration, are largely absent. Second, East Germany underwent a substantial economic
transition from a state-led economy towards a market economy, causing long-lasting
economic instability, whereas the West German economy represented, in comparison, a
stable and high-wage labor market, allowing us to focus our analysis on the influence of
labor market developments in the source region. Third, the unexpected and profound
changes introduced by the reunification process introduce a randomness into individual
labor market histories helping us to identify the causal returns to migration. Becoming
unemployed was likely to be less selective in East Germany than in developed Western
countries at the time. Based on novel administrative panel data involving labor market
outcomes before and after migration (BASiD), we focus on the second wave of migrants
from East Germany after reunification, who were not leaving immediately during 1989
or 1990 and who migrated later in response to deteriorating labor market conditions.
As theoretical background regarding the determinants of migration decisions and
the selection of migrants, a large literature relies on an augmented Roy model, as pop-
ularized by Borjas (1987).2 The basic Roy model predicts positive (negative) selection
of migrants, depending upon whether the returns to skill are higher (lower) in the des-
tination region compared to the source region. Based on this, the descriptive evidence
showing larger wage inequality and larger returns to skills in West Germany compared to
East Germany (Krueger and Pischke (1995), Burda and Hunt (2001), Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln
et al. (2010)) would suggest that East-to-West migrants were positively selected. How-
ever, such aggregate measures do not necessarily reflect the individual migrant’s returns.
Moreover, the model does not include uncertainty about labor market outcomes in the
source region and ignores the central role that unemployment can play in migration de-
2Empirical tests of di↵erent variants of this model can be found in, among others, Borjas et al.
(1992), Hunt and Mueller (2004), Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), Kaestner and Malamud (2014), Parey
et al. (2017), Bartolucci et al. (2018). Bru¨cker and Tru¨bswetter (2007) use the model as a framework
to analyse the selection of East German migrants to West Germany.
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cisions. We analyze whether and to what extent these factors a↵ect migration returns,
thus being drivers of the migration decision.3
Our empirical analysis estimates the average e↵ect of treatment (⌘ migration) on
the treated (⌘ migrants) based on detailed administrative panel data (BASiD) at the
monthly frequency.4 The data show a distinct pre-migration dip in earnings and em-
ployment a few months before migration, mostly driven by a substantial increase in the
unemployment rate of prospective migrants. To capture this development, we carefully
align migrants and our control group with respect to the timing of migration. To allow
for the di↵erent counterfactual labor market developments in East Germany, we define
two di↵erent control groups. We thus estimate two di↵erent treatments based on two
di↵erent control groups. The first treatment is migration-vs-staying, where stayers are
individuals who stay in East Germany and who do not find a new job in the same year,
i.e. who remain unemployed or stay in their job. The second treatment is migration-
vs-job-change, where job changers are individuals who find a new job in East Germany
during the same year (similar to Ham et al. (2011)). We show that the subsequent em-
ployment e↵ects of a temporally aligned job change/job finding in East Germany lead
to substantially and consistently lower returns to migration for migration-vs-job-change
compared to migration-vs-staying.
Experimental settings allowing to identify the returns to migration are very rare
(an exception being the migration lottery in Tonga used by McKenzie et al. (2010)).
Our rich BASiD data o↵er detailed information on individual, regional, and employer
characteristics as well as labor market history in East Germany before migration. Fur-
thermore East Germany su↵ered a strong negative labor demand shock, which limits
the role of selection with respect to unobserved individual heterogeneity. This justifies
3Other recent studies which analyze the selection of migrants into internal migration are Young
(2013), De la Roca and Puga (2017) or De la Roca (2017), who study rural-to-urban migration and
find a positive selection of migrants, because skilled individuals can obtain higher returns to their
skills in urban regions compared to rural regions. Lkhagvasuren (2014) and Amior (2015) analyze the
selection of migrants between regions by skills. Arntz et al. (2014) relate di↵erences in the aggregate
unemployment rates between di↵erent German regions to the selection of internal migrants.
4Note that we estimate the returns to migration for migrants. Hence, the results are relevant for
East German non-migrants who are similar to migrants with respect to the drivers of labor market
outcomes, but who di↵er in terms of expectations and moving costs.
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a selection-on-observables assumption similar to Ham et al. (2011) or Zaiceva (2010)).5
While there is some disagreement in the international literature on the sign of the
returns to migration,6 the literature on East-to-West migration in Germany suggests
substantial positive returns to migration. Burda and Hunt (2001) and Hunt (2006)
present strong descriptive evidence regarding positive wage returns to migration in the
early 1990s, which decline over time but still remain substantial in the late 1990s.7 We
extend upon the existing evidence by the use of more detailed data, by accounting for
the dynamics before migration, and by the analysis of the heterogeneity of returns.
Our causal estimates of the returns to migration on earnings and employment
prove positive and substantial, with the returns of migration-vs-job-change being much
smaller than the returns of migration-vs-staying. We find returns to migration of 21%
in daily earnings (where spells of unemployment are counted as 0 earnings) compared
to job changers, with returns being quite stable over the course of two years after migra-
tion and across migration cohorts. Compared to stayers, the initial gains for migrants
are substantially higher (105% higher initial earnings), and the gains decline somewhat
over time amounting to 35% two years after migration. A persistently higher employ-
ment rate of those who change jobs compared to stayers is the key driver of the di↵erent
returns to migration.
There is also strong heterogeneity in the returns by gender and by labor market
outcomes before migration. Returns are higher for males and for individuals with
lower pre-migration earnings and less stable employment. Heterogeneity of returns may
thus explain non-migration of those with stable labor market histories and high paying
jobs. When controlling for regional price di↵erences, returns to migration are lower
but still remain substantial. At a methodological level, accounting for the dynamics of
5Di↵erent non-experimental approaches have been used in the literature, such as Heckman (1979)
type selection models to control for unobservables driving the selection of migrants and stayers (e.g.
Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980), Tunali (2000), Nakosteen and Westerlund (2004), Bartolucci et al.
(2018)), fixed-e↵ects or di↵erence-in-di↵erences (e.g. Yankow (2003), Lehmer and Ludsteck (2011)) or
instrumental variable estimation (Venhorst and Co¨rvers (2018), Zaiceva (2006), Ham et al. (2011)).
6Most studies finds positive returns, but there are studies with insignificant e↵ects (for example
Zaiceva (2006)) or even negative e↵ects (Borjas et al. (1992), Tunali (2000)).
7See also Bru¨cker and Tru¨bswetter (2007) and Alm et al. (2014) for evidence on positive returns.
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unemployment is crucial in light of the pre-migration dip in earnings and employment
because more than 50% of the migrants are unemployed before migration. We show
that implementing a standard Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences approach or using data at the
annual frequency thus yields downwardly biased estimates.
In light of the low net migration between East and West Germany after 1992, size-
able migration costs may have prevented individual migration despite strong positive
returns. We thus also investigate non-financial/behavioral barriers to migration. Be-
cause BASiD lacks information on these, we provide evidence based on the German
Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP). Conditional on the control variables used in the anal-
ysis of returns, migrants prove less risk-averse, less attached to their place of living,
less likely to be married, and they have less children as well as a higher willingness to
move. Additionally, prospective migrants (and job changers) worry more about their
economic future compared to stayers. Worries about one’s own economic situation, the
perceived need to find a new job and low barriers to migration are important drivers of
migration. In turn, being employed in a stable job in East Germany strongly reduces
the willingness to migrate, also because returns to migration are much lower for such
workers.
The remainder of paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the historical
background. Theoretical consideration for the role of source region characteristics are
developed in Section 3, and Section 4 presents the dynamic treatment approach. Sec-
tion 5 describes the administrative panel data used. The main empirical findings are
discussed in Section 6, while Section 7 provides additional analyses. Section 8 turns to
the analysis of migration costs. Section 9 concludes. The appendix provides further
details.
2 Background
Starting in 1990, steps for a swift political and economic integration of East Germany
into the Federal Republic of Germany were implemented, e.g. harmonization of insti-
5
tutions (collective bargaining), monetary union, and starting the privatization of state
owned enterprises. In the early 1990s, many observers expected a convergence of wages
in the medium run (Burda (1993)). East German real wages rose substantially in the
first years after reunification, increasing by on average 83% from 1990 to 1996 according
to Hunt (2000). However, this process of convergence stagnated after a while. The left
graph in Figure 1 shows that average earnings in the East remained at around 75%
relative to West Germany between the mid 1990s and the late 2000s and have increased
to about 80% since. Many authors believe that the adjustment of wages in East Ger-
many strongly contributed to the surge in unemployment in East Germany (examples
include Burda and Hunt (2001) and Snower and Merkl (2006)). Hunt (2000) notes that
between 1989 and 1992, employment rates fell from 89% to 73% in East Germany.8
The graph on the right in Figure 1 shows that unemployment rates in East Germany
were much higher than in West Germany and the di↵erence has only slowly decreased
in recent years. Thus, despite the early convergence trend, substantial di↵erences in
average earnings and unemployment remain between East and West Germany.9
[Figure 1 about here.]
In the light of the documented persistent East-West di↵erences in labor market out-
comes, migration to the West appears attractive. However, Figure 2 shows a di↵erent
picture for gross East-to-West and West-to-East migration as well as for net migration
from 1989 to 2013. Net migration to the West was high in the early years after reuni-
fication in 1989 to 1991 and then declined swiftly until it picked up again in the late
1990s. In recent years, net migration from East Germany converged to zero.10 Even
8Liepmann (2018) is an recent exemplary study showing that the deteriorating labor market condi-
tions in East Germany had strong behavioral e↵ects, with the study focusing on the decline of fertility.
9Our analysis based on a regional price index shows that this holds true in nominal and real terms
(adjusted for the costs of living).
10Aggregate flows might give the impression that after a short time nearly as many West Germans
migrated to East Germany as East Germans migrated to West Germany. However, this interpretation
is in so far misleading as a substantial share of West to East migrants are East Germans who return
from West Germany. Thus, one should not interpret the development of net migration as East Ger-
many becoming more attractive for West Germans to migrate to, but rather reflecting sizeable return
migration of East Germans. Additionally, these figures only count East Germans who move to West
Germany, thus excluding commuters.
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though migration was still sizeable after the first strong migration wave of the early
1990s, the persistence of economic di↵erences and the relative ease of migration with
regard to cultural di↵erences or bureaucratic hurdles could have been expected to create
an even greater number of migrants who wanted to improve their living standards by
taking up work in West Germany.
[Figure 2 about here.]
3 Labor Market Dynamics and Migration Costs
The most popular theoretical model to explain the selection of migrants (and thus the
migration decision) is the augmented Roy model described by Borjas (1987). The focus
of this model lies on the returns to skill in the destination and the source region, as well
as on earnings uncertainity in the destination region and (in some variants, for exam-
ple in Chiquiar and Hanson (2005)) on earnings dependent migration costs. However,
the model does not account for the labor market dynamics in the source region before
and after migration (especially transitions between employment and unemployment)
and the implications for earnings uncertainty. Furthermore, (non-monetary) moving
costs typically play only a small role in studies based on the model. Both aspects
are particularly important in settings in which individuals contemplate migration from
an economically worse and unstable source region (e.g. facing a high risk of becom-
ing/staying unemployed) to a economically more stable destination region. This point
is particularly important in our case with migrants having excellent information about
labor market chances in the destination region and facing low financial/institutional
moving costs. The situation in the source region then explains the negative selection of
migrants that we find in our data, which is contrary to what the standard Roy model
would predict for the selection of migrants from East to West Germany based on the
observation that wage dispersion in the destination region is higher than in the source
region.11
11The wage dispersion among employees was higher in the West compared to the East for most of
the 1990’s until it in the late 1990’s (Burda and Hunt (2001), Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln et al. (2010)). Also,
7
As conceptional focus of our analysis, we stress four key aspects. First, we scrutinize
the labor market dynamics (earnings and employment) of migrants before migration.
We show that changes in pre-migration earnings and employment outcomes act as key
drivers of migration. Therefore, one has to take account of the timing of migration with
regard to the pre-migration history. This requires the availability of high-frequency
panel data and a dynamic treatment approach (as described in section 4) accounting
for the fact that workers migrate at di↵erent points in time in response to changes in
individual labor market outcomes (e.g. losing one’s job) in the source region.
The second aspect concerns expectations about future labor market chances, which
can have a strong impact on migration decisions. Hence, in a situation of high labor
market uncertainty, unemployed individuals or individuals with low earnings may sim-
ply migrate because they do not expect their situation in the source region to improve
quickly. Specifically, if employment chances are expected to deteriorate strongly after
a job loss, then the probability to migrate increases.12 This holds in particular, when
individuals are overpessimistic about their future labor market prospects in the source
region.
Third, we distinguish explicitly between job change and staying as alternative coun-
terfactuals to migration. In response to deteriorating employment chances in the source
region, individuals may change to a di↵erent job in the source region instead of migrat-
ing. Ham et al. (2011) consider job change as the relevant counterfactual because
migration also involves a job change. We think that both counterfactuals are of inter-
est in a setting with strong mobility between employment and unemployment and we
returns to age/experience (Krueger and Pischke (1995), Jurajda and Harmgart (2007), Orlowski and
Riphahn (2009)) and to education (Krueger and Pischke (1995)) are higher in the West. Therefore,
the Roy model would predict that East-to-West migrants are positively selected (Parey et al. (2017))
or show no selection. Other existing theoretical models used in the literature to analyze East-to-West
migration do not focus on the selection of migrants, returns to migration or the role of unemployment
in this (see e.g. Heise and Porzio (2018), Burda (1995)).
12In our setting, this assumes that the wage in the West is una↵ected by individual employment
shocks in the East, which is plausible since a negative labor demand shock for an individual in East
Germany is unlikely to have a strong impact on labor market chances in West Germany. This seems
justified because the risk of job loss in East Germany is high due to the reunification-caused transition
process, implying that a job loss in East Germany is not viewed as a negative signal by West German
employers. Furthermore, the qualitative results still hold as long as labor market prospects in West
Germany are less negatively a↵ected by job loss than labor market prospects in East Germany.
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estimate the treatment e↵ect with respect to both counterfactuals.
Finally, we investigate perceived (non-monetary) migration costs based on pre-
migration survey information. In addition to the proxies for migration costs often
discussed in the literature (for example marital status, children), we also consider other
potential behavioral determinants like attitudes towards migration or risk aversion to
analyze whether migrants and non-migrants show substantial di↵erences in these factors
before migration.
Appendix 9 develops a formal dynamic model of the migration decision that captures
the most important aspects of interest for our analysis. Here, we sketch the model in a
nutshell. We posit a three period model. In period 0, it is given whether an individual
is employed or not. Employment in the source region in periods 1 and 2 follows a
Markov process, with the probability to remain employed being strictly higher than the
probability to become employed. Individuals can migrate at the beginning of periods 1
and 2. Further key assumptions are that wages in the destination and the source region
are assumed to be constant and that there are sizeable migration costs. Restricting
uncertainty to job loss and job finding in the source region greatly simplifies the analysis
while focusing upon the main risk faced by East Germans during the transition period in
the 1990s. The decision to migrate is modelled as a function of the employment state
and expectations regarding state dependent employment probabilities in the source
region.
Key model implications are the following: The migration probability falls with the
wage in the source region and with migration costs, it is higher for unemployed than
for employees, and it rises with the wage in the destination region. Since expectations
about future employment matter, the migration probability falls with better employ-
ment prospects in the source region. Therefore, key obstacles to migration are high
migration costs and overly optimistic expectations about labor market chances in the
source region. Among individuals, who migrate at the beginning of period 2, the em-
ployment situation or the expectation about the future employment prospects must
have deteriorated in period 1 relative to period 0 or migration costs must have fallen
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over time. The model implies a negative selection of migrants with respect to labor mar-
ket outcomes in the source region and it rationalizes the dynamic treatment approach
in section 4.
4 Dynamic estimation approach
Our goal is to estimate the causal e↵ect of East-to-West migration on earnings and
unemployment, focusing on the average e↵ect of treatment (⌘migration) for the treated
(⌘ migrants) [ATT]. The observed outcome (earnings, unemployment) is Y = D · Y1 +
(1   D) · Y0, where Y1 and Y0 are the potential outcomes under migration or non-
migration, respectively, and D is the migration dummy. We consider two counterfactual
outcomes Y0 corresponding to two di↵erent treatments. These are (i) staying in the East
without starting a new job in in a given year, referred to as the treatment migration-vs-
staying, and (ii) starting a new job in the same month as migration (including finding
a job after unemployment), referred to as the treatment migration-vs-job-change. The
non-migration outcome entails the possibility of future migration.
Identification relies on a Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), similar to
Ham et al. (2011) or Zaiceva (2010). Our rich panel data allow us to control for in-
dividual employment histories on a monthly basis, socio-demographic characteristics,
employer information, and detailed regional information, which arguably allow us to
predict well the counterfactual outcomes for both treatments. In particular, we condi-
tion on labor market histories up to the month before migration, which accounts for
unobservable factors a↵ecting labor market success. Based on the available data, it
would be di cult to justify an instrumental variable or selection approach.13 Our CIA
- to be spelled out below - implies that given our rich conditioning set, selection into
13A sizeable number of studies use a standard cross-sectional Heckman (1979) two step estimator,
see e.g. Tunali (2000), Bru¨cker and Tru¨bswetter (2007), or Bartolucci et al. (2018). In addition to
relying on strong distributional assumptions, this requires a credible exclusion restriction (essentially
an instrument), being di cult to justify based on administrative data from 1992 onward (see section
5). For our setting, we have to account for dynamic selection, because people migrate in di↵erent
time periods and migrants were non-migrants before. Such a setting would even require time-varying
instruments (see Heckman and Navarro (2007)).
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migration is not driven by factors related to future labor market outcomes in the East
(recall that we restrict estimation to the ATT). This means that our results apply to the
large group of East Germans who are similar in observable and unobservable skills to mi-
grants. Estimation of the average treatment e↵ect in a dynamic setting would require
much stronger identifying assumptions. By conditioning on individual employment
histories based on monthly data, we extend upon a standard di↵erence-in-di↵erences
(DiD) estimator. The latter is not justified because we observe a disproportionate pre-
migration dip in earnings and employment during the last months before migration
takes place, similar to the widely documented Ashenfelter’s dip studied in the training
literature (Heckman and Smith, 1999).
Most of the literature estimating the ATT of migration uses non-migrants in the
source region as control group. As noted by Ham et al. (2011) for the US, migration of
a worker typically entails a job change, thus suggesting to focus on the migration-vs-
job-change treatment to isolate the returns to job changing from returns to migration.
We view staying in the East without starting a new job and job change in the East as
two alternative treatments in a multiple treatment setting, representing two possible
counterfactual treatments while remaining in the East, and we estimate the causal
e↵ect of migration against both (Imbens (2000), Lechner (2001)). For migration-vs-
job-change, we follow Ham et al. (2011) in using job changers who do not migrate to
the West as the control group. For migration-vs-staying, our control group involves
those East Germans who do not migrate and who either keep their job in the East
or who lose their job (or remain unemployed) without starting a new one in a given
year. We assume that the CIA holds for both treatments. However, if one is concerned
that we may not be able to control su ciently for the selection into staying versus job
change in the East, one should view the two counterfactuals as alternative estimates
of the expected non-migration outcome in the East, thus providing a robustness check
motivated by the concerns raised in Ham et al. (2011).
We model the selection into migration as a dynamic process. Individuals who decide
not to migrate in time period t can still do so later when circumstances have changed.
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Including only never-migrants in the control group would condition on future outcomes.
To avoid this, we follow Sianesi (2004) and Biewen et al. (2014) in estimating the e↵ect
of treatment (⌘ migrating now) versus waiting. This means that we include future
migrants (and future job changers) in the control group for period t. Formally, the ATT
for the treatment migration-in-period-t-versus-waiting on outcomes in period t + a is
given by
ATT (t, a) = E(Y1,t(t+ a)  Y0,t(t+ a)|Dt = 1, D1 = ... = Dt 1 = 0) ,
whereDt denotes the dummy for migration in period t, Y1,t(t+a) the migration outcome,
and Y0,t(t + a) the non-migration outcome in period t + a, where a measures months
before/after treatment. Both outcomes are associated with the treatment sequence no-
migration-up-to-period-t, i.e. D1 = ... = Dt 1 = 0. We view migration as an absorbing
state, meaning Dt = 1 implies that the individual is not at risk of migrating to the
West after period t and thus not to be included in the control group for future migrants.
This means that we estimate the return to the first migration only, while including post-
migration outcomes even after return migration.
The identification of ATT (t, a) builds on a dynamic version of the CIA such that
conditional on the covariates and the labor market history up until period t   1 the
potential non-treatment outcome Y0,t(t+a) from t onward (a   0) is conditionally mean
independent of migration in period t. Formally, the dynamic CIA we assume is
E(Y0,t(t+a)|Dt = 1, D1 = ... = Dt 1 = 0, Xt) = E(Y0,t(t+a)|Dt = 0, D1 = ... = Dt 1 = 0, Xt),
where Xt involves all time-varying covariates and lagged labor market outcomes.
As we document for our data below, migrants experience a substantial decline in
employment and earnings before migration, which is clearly visible based on monthly
data. Because of this pre-migration dip, it is important to align migrants and com-
parable non-migrants by their outcome history until period t   1, the month before
treatment time. Simply comparing migrants and non-migrants at a specific point in
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time would group migrants with di↵erent durations until migration, thus confounding
the short-run pre-migration outcome dynamics.
For estimation of ATT (t, a), we first align the treated and the non-treated by treat-
ment calendar month t and we then control for di↵erences in covariates and outcome
history. For the control group of job changers, migrants are compared to those chang-
ing jobs in the same month when migration takes place. For stayers, the temporal
alignment is less obvious because every month could be the counterfactual “month of
migration”. As control group, we use all stayers as observed in the year of migration
of a specific migration cohort. Non-migrating unemployed are treated as job changers
if they start a job during the calendar year of migration. The remaining unemployed
who do not start a job during this year are treated as stayers. The appendix includes
further details on the alignment. For each treatment month t, we estimate the ATTs
for months 0 to 24 after treatment in t as well as the pre-treatment di↵erences for the
24 months before t, i.e. the ATT (t, a)’s are estimated based on observed outcomes in
t + a, where a =  24, ..., 24. The pre-treatment di↵erences (a < 0) should be close to
zero if treated and non-treated are well aligned according to equation (4). To obtain the
overall ATT (a) for all migrants a months after treatment, we first estimate ATT (t, a)
for all calendar month t + a separately. Then, the migration cohort specific ATT (a)
is estimated as a weighted average using the distribution of migrants over a 12-months
window as weights (see Appendix for details). Finally, the overall ATT (a) is estimated
as the weighted average over all sample years (cohorts).
To account for the di↵erences in observables Xt (covariates, outcome history up
to t   1) between treated and non-treated after temporal alignment, we use inverse
probability reweighting (IPW) based on normalized weights (Busso et al. (2014)). IPW
equalizes the distribution of observables between treated and non-treated. We first
estimate the probability of migration in month t (the propensity score) using a logistic
regression of the migration dummy on Xt. Since the determinants of migration might
change over time, a pooled propensity score is estimated separately for every year, also
accounting for calendar month dummy variables. In the second step, we reweight the
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distribution of observables in the control groups towards the treatment group. Note that
the group of migrants is much smaller than our two control groups and the necessary
overlap of support for the distribution of the propensity score for the ATT is given.14
For the two treatment cases, we estimate separate logit models based on migrants and
the specific control group only. The reweighted outcomes before migration (a < 0) allow
for an assessment of how well the reweighting strategy works in balancing the outcome
history (which is part of Xt). The outcomes for the 24 months after migration provide
estimates of the treatment e↵ects. To account for the possibility of remaining covariate
imbalance and to explore the heterogeneity of treatment e↵ects, we also estimate ex
post outcome regressions after inverse probability weighting as in Fitzenberger et al.
(2013). Inference is based on bootstrapped asymptotic standard errors, clustered at the
individual level.
5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The core data used stem from the “Biographies of selected insurance agencies in Ger-
many” (BASiD), a high-quality administrative panel data set linking a 1% sample of
the German pension insurance accounts with the entries of the same individuals in the
“Integrated Employment Biographies” (IEB) (Hochfellner et al. (2012)). The BASiD
covers all individuals with at least one employment record with social security contribu-
tions, comprising about 80% of the German workforce (this excludes civil servants, self-
employed, marginally employed and non-employed). Provided the employment criterion
is satisfied, the data also include information on registered unemployment, additional
schooling, or maternity leave. Attractive features of the BASiD are that employment
before reunification is recorded and that the sample size is much larger compared to the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the data source used in most of the existing
literature on East-to-West migration.
Complete labor market histories in the East after reunification are recorded in
14Note that we can not estimate the average treatment e↵ect of migration for the non-migrants
(further details on the overlap of the propensity score distributions are available upon request).
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BASiD from 1992 to 2006, allowing us to consider migration from 1994 to 2004 while
controlling for two years of history and estimating post-migration e↵ects for two years.
Migrants in this second wave of migration di↵er from the large number of migrants
in the first wave of migration in 1989 and 1990. On the one hand, individuals with
low migration costs are likely to have migrated in the first wave in light of the strong
economic incentives for migration. On the other hand, the majority of migrants in the
second wave has experienced some unemployment in East Germany after reunification,
as a consequence of the restructuring of the East German economy.
Our analysis is restricted to individuals who worked in East Germany before reuni-
fication.15 Migration is defined as a change in the location of the workplace from East
to West, which includes commuters. We focus on the first migration spell only, thus
abstracting from return migration and repeated migration. Note that the vast major-
ity of migrants only migrates once to West Germany. To avoid misclassifications (e.g.
internships, seasonal jobs, highly volatile employment histories), a migration episode is
only considered if it lasts at least three months.
Table 1 shows basic descriptive statistics for the time period 1994 to 2004, as mea-
sured one month before migration or job change - except for stayers, for whom all
observations are used. Compared to stayers, migrants and job changers are more likely
to be male. Migrants are also younger, while job changers and stayers are close in age.
We find no selection regarding education, except for a slightly higher (lower) share of
university graduates (apprenticeship degree holders) among stayers. A higher share of
migrants and job changers work in construction prior to migration, possibly because
migrants in construction could transfer their human capital to West Germany more eas-
ily than other employees or there was a shortage of construction workers in the West.
In particular, this holds for migrants in the early 1990s before the construction boom in
15These individuals experienced reunification as a sudden shock in their labor market environment,
and they had to decide whether to migrate or not. Their motives are likely to di↵er from those who
did not already work in GDR times, and they form the much larger group in the 1990s. Furthermore,
it is di cult to identify those East Germans who never worked in East Germany before reunification,
because individuals are first recorded when they start their first job. Since there is evidence for
young East Germans sorting into studying or taking up an apprenticeship in West Germany, including
individuals without employment in the East during GDR times might introduce a sorting bias.
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the East. In contrast, there are very few migrants who were former public employees,
while their share is much higher among job changers. This may be explained by a
higher specificity of human capital among public employees.
[Table 1 about here.]
With regard to labor market history, unemployment during the past 12 months,
unemployment since reunification, and job changes in the past are more common among
migrants and job changers compared to stayers. In our analysis, unemployment includes
all times when an individual is not in (social-security registered) work or training. In
terms of spatial allocation, the distribution across federal states of the last job are very
much alike for job changers and stayers. Relative to the two other groups, migrants
more often come from Thuringia and Brandenburg and less often from Saxony. The
share of migrants from Berlin is low because moving from East Berlin to West Berlin
is excluded since it just involves changing workplaces in the same city. Migration
from other locations in East Germany to West Berlin is counted as migration, but the
results are robust if these migration spells are also excluded. Note that Thuringia and
Brandenburg o↵er particularly good opportunities for commuters. Overall there are
substantial di↵erences between migrants and stayers in observable characteristics, with
job changers being more similar to migrants (see also Ham et al. (2011)).
Our IPW approach can make use of a rich set of covariates in BASiD to align
treated and non-treated, including sex, age, education, tenure in the current/last firm
(since 1992), number of job changes (since 1992), industry, occupation, total tenure
in the industry of the last job (since 1992), current employment status, months in
unemployment in the last 12 months, months in continuous unemployment (0 for the
employed), share of time in unemployment since reunification, federal state of last job,
population/mean employment/mean earnings/distance to Western border of the district
of the last job and number of employees/median of earnings in the last firm (all evaluated
one month before migration). Regarding labor market history, we consider earnings
and employment one month before migration as well as unemployment experience,
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earnings, number of past job changes and industry, measured 6, 12, and 24 months
before migration. Paying particular attention to unemployment in the past is crucial
because about 50% of migrants are unemployed before migration. This drop generates
the pre-migration dip in outcomes.
Our outcome variables of interest are earnings and unemployment at a monthly
frequency. Earnings are defined as the daily wage for employed individuals and as
zero for the unemployed. Thus, a change in earnings may reflect a change in on-the-
job earnings or a change in the employment status. Real earnings are calculated in
2004 Euros using the aggregate consumer price index for Germany. Unemployment is
measured as a binary variable. The sample used for the further analysis includes all
individuals who have non-missing values in all control variables in the month before
migration. Observations of individuals after entering retirement are excluded.
6 Main Empirical Findings
Figure 3 provides first graphical evidence on the evolution of earnings and unemploy-
ment for the three groups by month before/after treatment. Job changers and stayers
are temporally aligned to the treatment month of migrants as described above. Since
the results do not vary stronlgy across cohorts, we aggregate over the migration years
1994 to 2004. Figure 3 reveals that, before migration, earnings (unemployment) of mi-
grants and job changers lie below (above) the level for stayers, which shows a negative
selection of the former two groups relative to stayers. In addition, there is a contin-
uous and accelerating decline in earnings and employment among migrants and job
changers before the treatment month. The strong increase in unemployment among
migrants and job changers seems to be the main driver for the strong pre-migration
dip in labor market outcomes.16 In contrast, earnings and employment among stayers
remains fairly stable over time. Intuitively, the results indicate that a deterioration of
the labor market situation in East Germany increases the migration propensity. Those
16The earnings among employed migrants and job changers remain stable over time, but are also
lower than those of stayers.
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who stay predominantly show a stable development over time, while the employment
rate among prospective migrants drops dramatically in the months before migration.
This motivates our conceptual focus on the labor market developments pre-migration,
especially unemployment, and underlines the importance of the timing of migration.
The proximity of the developments for job changers and migrants shows that workers
who change jobs/find a job in East Germany at the same time as migrants (in West
Germany), show a similar decline in the labor market outcomes in the months before
their job change.
[Figure 3 about here.]
After treatment (from month zero onward), migration and job change are associated
with a strong initial boost in employment and earnings. By definition, unemployment
among migrants and job changers falls to zero in the treatment month, increasing
average earnings for both groups. Migrants can additionally profit from the higher
wage level in the West, which raises their average earnings above those of stayers,
who were in a substantially better labor market position in the time before migration.
With respect to the development over time after migration/job change, earnings for
both migrants and job changers fall continuously during the first year after treatment,
driven by an associated increase in unemployment. Both outcomes stabilize during the
second year. The outcomes of stayers do not change much after treatment, showing
a stable level over the four-year period considered, idicating that the vast majority of
stayers has a job and keeps it during the analyzed period.
While the descriptive evidence on the evolution of outcomes in Figure 3 can be
used to study the pre-migration developments of the di↵erent groups, it is not informa-
tive about actual returns to migration. One can see that at least the group of stayers
strongly di↵ers from migrants with respect to individual characteristics and labor mar-
ket developments before migration. To make job changers and stayers provide valid
counterfactuals for the hypothetical labor market development in East Germany for
migrants after the date of migration, we will reweight stayers and job changers towards
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migrants using IPW. This allows us to estimate the treatment e↵ects of migration com-
pared to the two counterfactuals and to assess if the di↵erent definitions of stayers and
job changers lead to substantially di↵erent counterfactuals in East Germany and thus
to di↵erent treatment e↵ects (returns to migration ).
6.1 Estimated returns to migration
We estimate the ATTs of migration-vs-staying and migration-vs-job-change by apply-
ing IPW, thus accounting for the selection of migrants with regard to di↵erences in
covariates and pre-treatment labor market history. The latter is particularly important
in light of the pre-migration and pre-job-change dip in earnings and employment.17
Figure 4 shows the evolution of earnings and unemployment for the three treatment
groups aggregated over all cohorts after IPW, showing that IPW is very successful in
aligning earnings and unemployment prior to migration.18
[Figure 4 about here.]
Accounting for selection has a di↵erent e↵ect for job changers and stayers (compare
Figure 3 and Figure 4). The changes through re-weighting are not large for job changers.
The di↵erences compared to migrants decrease a bit, because job changers are more
strongly negatively selected than migrants. From the definition of job changers, it
follows that job changers provide the average counterfactual for migrants who would
have found a job in East Germany at the same time when the migration occurred (in
case of being unemployed before migration), or who would have changed jobs in East
Germany instead of taking up a job in West Germany (in case of being employed before
migration).
For stayers, the pre-migration trajectory is strongly a↵ected by IPW re-weighting
because now more weight is given to those stayers who experience a deterioration of
17The results of logit regressions used for estimating the treatment probability are shown in Table 6
in the Appendix (for readability, results aggregated over all cohorts with cohort dummies are reported,
while for the actual IPW weights, logit models are estimated for individual migration cohorts). Table
7 shows the means of the control variables (aggregated over all cohorts) by treatment group before and
after reweighting. IPW proves very e↵ective in equalizing the means of the control variables considered.
18The results by calendar years are shown in Figure 15 in the Appendix.
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their labor market outcomes mimicking the trajectory for migrants. However, after the
month of (potential) migration the curves di↵er in a substantial way. The reason for
this is that, by definition of the comparison group (the alternative treatment to migra-
tion), stayers do not experience a specific event in month 0. Rather, they represent an
average counterfactual among formerly employed and unemployed workers, who show
gradual transitions between the two employment states in the months after potential
migration. The gradual increase of employment and earnings after the month of poten-
tial migration for stayers is driven by di↵erent durations of additional unemployment
for unemployed stayers (or for the migrant if she would have stayed in East Germany),
which is consistent with a standard job search model. The large initial gap in earnings
between migrants and stayers is caused by higher wages in the West and a jump in
employment for migrants, which stayers (in contrast to migrants and job changers) do
not experience after period 0. The partial convergence between migrants and stayers
over time is due to falling employment di↵erences as unemployed stayers find a job and
some migrants become unemployed again. The aggregate developments thus show the
importance of accounting for unemployment, pre-migration developments and the tim-
ing of migration. Ignoring these factors would have led to a comparison of migrants to a
comparison group with di↵erent dynamic selection. Furthermore, the strong di↵erences
between stayers and job changers underline the substantial e↵ects that di↵erent coun-
terfactual developments in East Germany can have on returns to migration, confirming
for our setting the concerns raised by Ham et al. (2011).
Figure 5 shows the ATTs of migration-vs-staying (ATT Stay) and migration-vs-job-
change (ATT Stay), which are the di↵erences of the corresponding curves in Figure 4.
The di↵erences before month 0 are almost never statistically significant. In month 0,
the jump in earnings among migrants implies a return of ATT Stay = 33 Euro in daily
earnings (105% higher earnings) compared to stayers. However, returns strongly decline
afterwards to around 14 Euros two years after migration (35%). The month-0-returns
in daily earnings ATT JC compared to job changers are much smaller at 11 Euros (21%).
These returns fluctuate a bit afterwards but remain fairly stable over the post-treatment
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period amounting to 9 Euros (20%) in month 24. Both ATTs for earnings are highly
significant for the entire 24 months after migration, and ATT Stay is always significantly
higher than ATT JC (detailed results are available upon request). Regarding the ATT
for the second outcome, unemployment of migrants in month 0 is 51 percentage points
(pp) lower (ATT Stay=-51 pp) than for stayers and the di↵erence falls over time to 12
pp in month 24 (ATT Stay=-12 pp). While unemployment among migrants is similar to
job changers during the first months, it is (significantly) lower during the second year
and the absolute di↵erence increases over time.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Since migration shows significantly positive e↵ects against both alternative treat-
ments, the direction of the e↵ect of migration versus non-migration is robust. At the
same time, the stark di↵erences between the two treatment e↵ects ATT Stay and ATT JC
show the importance of the counterfactual in East Germany. When a new job is of-
fered in East Germany, the returns to migration are lower and therefore less likely to
exceed the individual costs of migration. Therefore, the propensity to migrate is likely
to increase when individuals become more pessimistic about employment chances in
the East, holding individual characteristics and labor market history constant. We will
further explore this in section 8.
6.2 Returns by Prior Employment Status
Since unemployment plays a central role for the pre-migration developments and the
size of returns to migration, we will provide further, more disaggregated results based
on the employment status before migration. The theoretical considerations in Section
3 presume that average earnings returns to migration are higher for those unemployed
before migration than for those employed. We now investigate the validity of this by re-
estimating the earnings returns to migration by employment status in the month before
treatment. Recall that among migrants and job changers about 50% are unemployed
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in the month before treatment, while unemployment among stayers amounts to about
20% (Figure 3).
We divide each of our three treatment groups (migrants, job changers and stayers)
into two subgroups based on their employment status in month -1. For stayers, we have
to address the di culty that they do not experience a treatment event in a given year.
Similar to the estimation of the ATT above, we replicate each stayer 12 times in a given
year and assign each replication a di↵erent calendar month as treatment month. These
12 replicated stayers are then assigned to the ”employed” or ”unemployed” group based
on the employment status in the month before the assigned treatment month.
Now, we re-estimate the earnings profiles separately for the subgroups defined by
the employment status using IPW after temporal alignment. The results are displayed
in Figure 6, to the left for the unemployed in -1 and to the right for the employed in
-1. The estimated profiles di↵er strongly for the two subgroups. For unemployed mi-
grants/job changers/stayers, earnings show qualitatively very similar profiles compared
to the results in Figure 4 for the entire sample, with a steeper decline before treatment
and a larger jump for migrants and job changers upon migrating/job changing. In
contrast, the profiles for the employed sample are very stable over time.
The initial ATT’s compared to job changers are comparable irrespective of the em-
ployment status before treatment, with ATT JC equal to 11 Euros in the ”unemployed”
sample and ATT JC equal to 11.5 Euros in the ”employed” sample. However, some
discrepancy arises over time, with the ATT JC after 24 months being equal to 9 Euros
in the unemployed and 7.5 Euros in the employed sample. This di↵erence is due to
the fact that the earnings of job changers who were employed before job change are
more stable than the earnings of job changers who find a job after a spell of unemploy-
ment, whereas the pre-migration employment status matters for the earnings level of
migrants, but not much for the development of earnings after migration.
The results are very di↵erent when comparing migrants and stayers. Migrants from
unemployment can realize an initial gain (ATT Stay) of 50 Euros compared to stayers
who are unemployed. In contrast, the ATT Stay is only 14 Euros compared to employed
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stayers. The large di↵erence arises through the higher employment rate (after migra-
tion) of migrants from unemployment compared to unemployed stayers. Migrants who
are employed before migration don’t gain that much compared to employed stayers.
The di↵erence in migration returns shrinks over time (the ATT Stay in month 24 is 19
Euros when unemployed and 8 Euros when employed before migration). This is due
to the increasing employment among formerly unemployed stayers which over time re-
duces the employment advantage of migrants. Altogether, the results show that there
are sizeable migration returns irrespective of the employment status before migration,
that there is not much di↵erence in the developments for the di↵erent control groups
when only workers who are employed in month -1 are considered, and that the large ag-
gregate migration returns compared to stayers are driven by those migrants and stayers
who are unemployed before treatment.
[Figure 6 about here.]
6.3 Additional Heterogeneity in Returns
So far, we have discussed the returns to migration aggregated across all migrants or
by employment status. Now, we further investigate the heterogeneity of returns with
regard to other important characteristics. This can provide some evidence for group-
specific variations in returns to migration, which should be connected to the migration
propensity if they are informative about variations in returns to migration for non-
migrants as well. For this purpose, we follow Fitzenberger et al. (2013) and estimate
weighted outcome regressions
Yia = ↵ + xi  +  aTi + Ti(xi   x¯) a + uia ,(1)
for period a =  24, ..., 24 relative to migration, where Yia are earnings, Ti the treat-
ment (migrant) dummy, xi are control variables and x¯ is the sample average among
the treated. The regressions are estimated based on migrants and non-migrants aligned
in time. Migrants carry a weight of one and the non-migrants are re-weighted accord-
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ing to the IPW (for further details see Fitzenberger et al. (2013)).  a measures the
heterogeneity in treatment e↵ects for di↵erent values of the control variables. The ex
post outcome regression in equation (1) also accounts for di↵erences in control variables
between treated and non-treated remaining after IPW. The regressions show two impor-
tant control variables that cause heterogeneity in returns to migration, namely gender
and earnings before migration.19 We now discuss graphical evidence on the di↵erences
in treatment e↵ects when grouping the data by these control variables, analogous to
the approach in section 6.2.
Figure 7 shows the ATTs by gender - and for comparison for the entire sample. The
returns to migration, both versus staying and versus job change, prove to be higher
for males than for females, reflecting the fact that the gender pay gap is higher in
the West than in the East (this is confirmed by running separate earnings regressions
with a gender dummy for the West sample and the East sample). The absolute and
relative gender gap in returns is higher for ATT JC than for ATT Stay. Still, the returns
to migration are significantly positive for both genders, and female migrants realize
substantial earnings gains relative to stayers.
[Figure 7 about here.]
We now turn to the ATTs by earnings before migration (in month -1) displayed
in Figure 8. To account for unemployment (zero earnings), we consider three groups,
namely no earnings (unemployed in month -1), positive earnings below/at the median
in -1, and positive earnings above the median in -1, where the median is based on
the sample with positive earnings. There is substantial heterogeneity, especially for
ATT Stay. For ATT JC , the di↵erences are mostly not statistically significant (the figure
to the left omits the large confidence intervals to avoid confusion of the lines). The
returns to migration are similar for those with no earnings or low earnings in -1, and
they are higher in both cases than for those with high earnings in -1. Turning to
ATT Stay, the di↵erences are larger and mostly significant. The returns to migration
19Regression results are not reported here, but available upon request
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are highest for those with no earnings in -1 and lowest for those with high earnings in
-1. Because earnings are measured in Euros, the di↵erences in relative returns among
those with positive earnings are even more striking. This evidence is consistent with
a limited transferability of human capital from the East to the West for high-earners,
discrimination towards East German migrants with respect to access to high-paying
jobs in the West or with di↵erent East-German skill-groups migrating into di↵erent
segments of the West German labor market where di↵erent returns to migration could
be realized.20 Sorting out these di↵erent explanations is beyond the scope of this paper.
[Figure 8 about here.]
In sum, the last two sections find strong evidence that the returns to migration are
higher for individuals with lower earnings potential in the East and that returns for
men are larger than for women. This is in line with lower migration rates for women
(even though there are probably also other important factors at play) and individuals
with a high earnings potential in East Germany.
7 Robustness Checks
7.1 Regional Price Di↵erences
There are persistent regional di↵erences in the cost of living in Germany. Prices are
lower in the East than the West and in rural areas compared to urban areas. As a
robustness check, we investigate whether returns to migration are still positive after
accounting for regional price di↵erences. While migrants on average take up a job in
more expensive regions (urban districts in the West), we do not expect sizeable changes
in the cost of living for stayers and job changers. We expect the estimates accounting for
regional price di↵erences to provide lower bounds of the returns to migration because
20Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2019) show that the e↵ects of East-to-West migration on native wages as
well as the wage gap between East German migrants and West German incumbent workers depended
on the degree of product and labor market regulations in di↵erent segments of the West German labor
market. Returns to migration might thus also have varied across these di↵erent segments.
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migrants (especially commuters) are likely to spend a sizeable share of their income in
the less expensive source region.
We have to address the problem that there are no consistent time series of regional
price indices at the district level, the finest regional unit in our data. 2009 is the first year
for which relative price di↵erences across districts are provided by the Bundesinstitut
fu¨r Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung (BBSR). We extrapolate the 2009 regional price
index (RPI) at the district level back to earlier years using price indices supplied by the
Federal Statistical O ce for the German states (La¨nder) from the year 1995 onward
as well as the di↵erential price indices in East and West Germany for the years 1992
to 1995 (Vortmann et al., 2013).21 Due to potential limitations of our regional price
index and the uncertainty about how much migrants spent in the East and the West,
we refrain from using the RPI in our main results.
Figure 9 contrasts the e↵ect of migration on real earnings after IPW based on the
aggregate CPI as above (‘Original’ in graph) and based on the regional price index
(RPI).22 After accounting for the RPI, the estimated e↵ects of migration on earnings
are reduced, as expected, because of the lower cost of living in the East. However, the
e↵ects of migration on real earnings remain strongly positive and show the same time
profile as for the estimates based on the aggregate CPI. For instance, after accounting
for the RPI, the ATT JC becomes 6 Euros (11%) and the ATT Stay 28 Euros (90%)
in month 0. Thus, our main findings are robust when accounting for regional price
di↵erences.
[Figure 9 about here.]
21There are no price indices for the states Bremen, Hamburg, and Schleswig-Holstein, for which we
use the price index for Lower Saxony (the closest large neighboring state).
22The city of Bonn is the reference for the RPI in 2009 (RPI=100 for Bonn). To ensure comparability
with and without RPI, we take stayers (the largest group) as our reference group and compute the
ratio between the real earnings with and without accounting for RPI at month -1. Then earnings
after deflation by RPI are divided by this ratio, thus using the stayer average in East Germany as new
reference level.
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7.2 Comparison to Standard Estimators
Our dynamic treatment approach stresses the importance of aligning detailed labor
market histories before migration in the presence of a pre-migration dip. Such a pattern
invalidates standard di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DiD) approaches and requires data at a
monthly frequency. Next, we investigate whether our methodological considerations
change the earnings e↵ects of migration in comparison to standard estimators used in
the literature. First, we implement standard DiD estimators of the e↵ect of migration.
Second, we redo our analysis based on data at the annual frequency. Figure 10 shows
the results of both exercises.
To implement the DiD approach based on monthly data, we run panel OLS regres-
sions with individual fixed e↵ects ↵i and year fixed e↵ects yeary(j) for individual i and
time period j. We also add calendar month fixed e↵ects monthm(j) (m ⌘Jan, Feb etc.)
to account for seasonality. Specifically, we estimate the following two regressions where
the first estimates the ATT Stay based on the migrant-stayer sample and the second
ATT JC based on the migrant-job-changer sample:
Yij = ↵i + yeary(j) +monthm(j) + Tij
24X
a=0
 aI[a(i, j) = a] + ✏ij (Stay)(2)
Yij = ↵i + yeary(j) +monthm(j) +
24X
a=0
(Tij a +  a)I[a(i, j) = a] + ✏ij (JC)(3)
Yij are earnings, Tij is the migration dummy (=1 after migration), a(i, j) is the number
of month since migration (job change), and I[.] is the indicator function. The specifi-
cation (JC) allows for a di↵erential e↵ect of time since job change in the control group
of job changers. Note that the individual fixed e↵ects capture the pre-migration di↵er-
ences between migrants and the comparison group. Thus,  a are the DiD estimates of
the earnings e↵ect of migration by month a since migration.
The DiD estimates for migration-vs-job-change displayed in Figure 10 (graph to the
left) are quite similar to the IPW results in Figure 5. This is because job changers and
migrants have a similar pre-treatment history, which is consistent with the common
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trends assumption needed for DiD. However, for stayers, the DiD estimates in Figure
10 (graph to the left) di↵er in a substantial way from to the IPW results in Figure 5.
The DiD estimates are downward biased, especially during the first year after migration.
Here, the common trends assumption is not fulfilled because of the pre-migration dip in
earnings. Since DiD averages the pre-treatment outcomes before migration, the method
does not account for the strong pre-migration dip in earnings.
[Figure 10 about here.]
As the second comparison, the graph on the right in Figure 10 provides IPW es-
timates based on annual data. Here, we only use the December information, thus
discarding the data from January to November of the same calendar year. We still use
those control variables which are based on monthly information (e.g. duration of unem-
ployment) because such variables may be available based on retrospective information
in data sets with annual data. The treatments migration and job change are now de-
fined based on the event taking place at some point in time within a calendar year. We
now align individuals in time based on the yearly information (e.g. year=-1 denotes 1 -
12 months before migration, year=0 0 - 11 months since migration) and we use IPW to
account for di↵erences in other characteristics. Our findings for year 0 imply an ATT JC
of 8 Euros (16%) and an ATT Stay of 18 Euros (46%). Simply averaging over the first
12 months after migration of our IPW estimates using monthly data yields returns of
10 Euros versus job change and 26 Euros versus staying.23 Thus, the analysis based on
annual data severely underestimates the returns to migration, especially in comparison
to stayers. Again, this is because using data at the annual frequency does not account
for the pre-migration dip in earnings.
23These are even lower bounds because returns to migration decline over time, and migrants in year
0 have migrated between 0 and 11 months before.
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8 Migration Barriers and Expectations
In light of the strong positive returns to migration, especially among individuals with
low earnings potential in the East, the question arises why migration is not higher in the
absence of legal restrictions or language/cultural di↵erences. Thus, it is of interest to
explore possible barriers to migration. In addition, our analysis points to the importance
of expectations about future labor market opportunities in the East.
The literature discusses di↵erent factors which may prove to be barriers to migra-
tion. Rosen (1972) and Roback (1982) analyze the role of amenity di↵erences. Bound
and Holzer (2000), Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), and Wozniak (2010) point to dif-
ferences in financial and psychological costs as determinants of migration. Heise and
Porzio (2018) document by revealed preferences that East Germans are willing to incur
large wage penalties for staying in the East compared to working in the West because
of locational preferences (“home-bias”). Behavioral economics emphasizes the role of
personality traits and attitudes for economic decision making. Jaeger et al. (2010) find
that migrants are on average less risk-averse than non-migrants and Canache et al.
(2013) show the impact of personality traits on the emigration decision.
Since the BASiD lacks information to further investigate these channels, we turn to
survey evidence from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP). The big shortcoming
of the data set is its small size: Among the 4200 adults in East Germany in 1990, there
are only 97 migrants between 1994 and 2004 who fit our treatment definition. However,
the GSOEP contains information on various factors not available in BASiD. To ensure
comparability with our analysis of returns, we use similar definitions of migrants, job
changers, and stayers, the same sample years, the same control variables (as far as they
are available), and IPW to account for di↵erences in observables. The main di↵erences
are: (i) with yearly data no temporal alignment at the monthly frequency is possible,
(ii) less information on district and firm, (iii) a logit model pooled over all years is
estimated because of the low number of migrants (including dummies for year and
month of interview), and (iv) migrants from East to West Berlin are included.
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Figure 11 shows the evolution of earnings before and after migration (earnings are
earnings in the month before the interview and time is measured in years before/after
migration). The GSOEP findings are qualitatively similar to the findings based on
BASiD, subject to the fact that the GSOEP does not provide monthly data. Before
treatment, migrants and job changers are negatively selected in earnings compared to
stayers.24 Earnings of both job changers and migrants show an initial upward jump
after job change/migration and a decline afterwards.
[Figure 11 about here.]
8.1 Financial and Psychological Costs
First, we consider four proxies for psychological or financial costs of migration, which
are often used in the literature: Marital status and number of children, owning a house
in the East25, and knowing someone who moved to the West (family, friend, colleague).
Table 2 provides means of the four proxies after IPW reweighting in the year before
migration. Migrants are less often married, have less children, and less often own a
house, indicating lower cost of migration. However, migrants less often know a person
who moved to the West. The latter finding is unexpected, but it may be explained
by the fact that this question was asked only in 1991 and thus had to be extrapolated
forward. In sum, the evidence on the first measures suggest lower migration costs among
migrants.
[Table 2 about here.]
24Other studies (e.g. Hunt (2006) or Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln (2009)) find a positive selection
of East-to-West migrants using the GSOEP, which is likely to be caused by the di↵erent definition of
the migrant group. Recall, that we only consider migrants with work experience during GDR times
who have lived in the East until migration. Additionally we only consider migrants who report a
change of jobs since the last interview to avoid misclassification. Without the last restriction, migrants
are only slightly negatively selected.
25Zaiceva (2006) uses this variable as an instrument for migration to the West.
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8.2 Risk Aversion and Attitudes towards Migration
The GSOEP elicits risk aversion in 2004 for the first time. Assuming stability over time,
we extrapolate risk aversion back to the time of migration (1994 to 2004). Further, we
consider the attitude to regional mobility and the attachment to the place of living,
which are elicited in the GSOEP for the years 1991 to 1999. Table 3 provides evidence on
these factors in the year before migration after IPW. In accordance with findings in the
literature, migrants show lower risk aversion (the higher the number the less risk averse
the individual), lower attachment to the place of living, and a higher willingness to move
than stayers, with the attitudinal di↵erences being quite substantial (lower locational
attachment is also found by to Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln (2009)). Job changers
are similar to stayers with regard to the willingness to move and lie between the two
groups with regard to risk aversion. However, they show an even lower attachment to the
place of living than migrants. This changes when migrants within Berlin are excluded
(as for the analysis based on BASiD). Then, migrants show the lowest attachment. It
is conceivable that shocks before migration influence the migration decision as well as
the willingness to move. In the years -4 to -2, the willingness to move for migrants is
indeed closer to non-migrants, but migrants still show higher willingness to move (see
Table 10 in the Appendix).
[Table 3 about here.]
8.3 Expectations and Worries
The GSOEP includes a number of variables on expectations and worries about the
individual’s economic situation in the East. First, East Germans were asked as to how
much they worry about their economic future. Second, all employed East Germans
were asked if they worry about losing their job, if they expect to be unemployed in
the next two years, and if they expect to voluntarily search for a new position in the
next two years. The worries were elicited every year between 1990 and 2015, whereas
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expectations at least every second year.26
Table 4 provides the evidence. Migrants are more worried about their economic
situation than stayers, with 34% being very worried (10% no worries), and job changers
are even more worried than migrants and stayers. At the same time, migrants are
actually similar to stayers in their optimism about the future, whereas job changers
are much more pessimistic. Thus, migrants worry about their economic situation in
the East but they are more optimistic in general terms and might expect for example
more success from migration compared to job changers (see also Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and
Schu¨ndeln (2009) who finds migrants to even be more optimistic than stayers and argues
that it is rather a measure for general outlook on life than a measure for the expectations
for the coming years). When also accounting by IPW for the greater worries among
migrants in -1 (results are available upon request), future earnings of non-migrants only
change marginally. Thus, worries do not predict future outcomes in the East but they
appear to be a driver of migration.
[Table 4 about here.]
Migrants and job changers are also more worried about job safety than stayers and
expect more often to search for a new job, while the evidence on job loss expectations
is less clear-cut (the share of “likely” or “surely” is considerably higher among migrants
and job changers, however, the share of those who state “surely not” is also higher).
Note that for the expectation variables the number of migrant observations is much
smaller. In sum, the evidence points towards the conclusion that worries about one’s
own economic situation in the East and the perceived need to find a new job are
important drivers of migration. Recall that we use IPW to account for di↵erence in
observables including past labor market outcomes in the East.
26After 1998, answers to the expectation questions were not elicited in four categories, but rather as
a (percentage) probability. To maintain the categorical structure and make it more comparable to the
worries questions, probabilities were grouped into four categories with 0-20% corresponding to ”Surely
not”, 30 - 50% to ”Rather unlikely”, 60-80% to ”Likely” and 90 - 100% to ”Surely”.
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9 Conclusions
This paper estimates the labor market returns of migration from East to West Ger-
many in the aftermath of German reunification based on rich administrative panel data
(BASiD). We focus on East Germans who already worked before reunification and who
stayed in the East for some time after reunification. To estimate the average treatment
e↵ect on the treated of migration-versus-staying and migration-versus-job-change, we
use a dynamic treatment approach conditioning on a rich set of observable covariates
including lagged labor market outcomes. Contrasting migrants against individuals who
have not migrated yields the returns to migration at a certain point of time and entails
the possibility that non-migrants migrate later.
As our key finding, migration causes sizeable positive returns with respect to earn-
ings and employment, both against staying and against job change in the East. Mi-
grants are negatively selected with regard to previous earnings and employment in the
East, experiencing a distinct pre-migration dip in outcomes. The returns to migration
are the higher the worse earnings and employment in the East before migration. Our
subsequent analysis shows that some of our findings di↵er from standard di↵erence-in-
di↵erences estimates and that it is important to use data at a monthly frequency to
account for the pre-migration dip in outcomes.
In light of the high returns to migration, it remains a puzzle as to why migra-
tion from East to West Germany in the 1990s was not even higher in the absence of
common barriers to migration (legal restrictions, language/cultural di↵erences). Our
analysis points to the role of migration costs and expectations about future labor mar-
ket prospects in the East. Because BASiD lacks information on these issues, we resort
to evidence based on the GSOEP, with the caveat in mind that the number of migrants
recorded in the GSOEP is much smaller than in BASiD. We find that future migrants
have worse expectations, worry more about their current economic situation, and show
lower behavioral barriers to mobility. We conclude that the second wave of migrants
from East to West Germany in the aftermath of reunification migrates in response to
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negative labor market prospects in East Germany. In turn, being employed in a stable
job in East Germany strongly reduces the willingness to migrate, also because returns to
migration are much lower for such workers. Still, a large number of East Germany with
similarly bad labor market prospects as the migrants choose not to migrate because of
monetary and behavioral barriers to migration.
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Figure 1: Aggregate norminal Earnings and Unemployment in East Germany
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Notes: Data on earnings are taken from the German Statistical O ce. Earnings are nominal average monthly pre-tax
earnings from Work in East and West Germany. Unemployment rates are taken from the ”Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit”
and are based on all registered unemployed and all workers who are not self-employed or employed by the military.
Figure 2: Migration between East and West Germany
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Notes: Migration numbers are taken from the German Statistical O ce. Migrants are individuals who changed their
registered place of living from East to West Germany or vice versa (thus no commuters or individuals who register a
secondary residence are included). Berlin is divided between East and West.
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Figure 3: Earnings and Unemployment without IPW
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Notes: Earnings (left) are real average daily earnings in Euro and unemployment (right) is the share of individuals
among all individuals in the sample who do not work. Both measures are computed based on temporal alignment for
the three groups for the months -24 to 24 before/after the treatment month. Population weights are used for all groups.
Observations are only excluded from the data if the individual enters retirement. Missing employment information are
treated as unemployment.
Figure 4: Earnings and Unemployment after IPW
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Notes: Earnings (left) are real average daily earnings in Euro and unemployment (right) is the share of individuals
among all individuals in the sample who do not work. Both measures are computed based on temporal alignment
for the three groups for the months -24 to 24 before/after the treatment month. Population weights are used for all
groups. Additionally IPW are used for job changers and stayers to reweight the within group distribution of observable
characteristics towards that of migrants. Observations are only excluded from the data if the individual enters retirement.
Missing employment information are treated as unemployment.
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Figure 5: Di↵erence in Earnings and Unemployment after IPW
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Notes: Graphs show the ATTs for earnings (left) and unemployment(right) based on the di↵erence in aggregate outcomes
displayed in Figure 4 after IPW has been applied. Confidence bands are calculated using bootstrapped standard errors
clustered at the individual level.
Figure 6: Results by Employment Status
(a) Unemployed before Migration (IPW)
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(b) Employed before Migration (IPW)
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Notes: Displayed are average daily earnings after population weights and IPW have been applied. The results for
the three treatment groups are presented for two subpopulations, those who were unemployed in the year before the
treatment month (conceptually stayers are replicated 12 times and assigned di↵erent treatment months and those who
are unemployed in the month before the hypothetical treatment month are assigned to the group of the unemployed) are
displayed on the left and those who are employed in the month before the treatment month are displayed on the right.
Average earnings and IPW are estimated separately for the two subpopulations.
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Figure 7: Heterogeneity in ATT based on Gender
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Notes: Results display heterogeneity in ATTs for average daily earnings depending on gender compared to job changers
(left) and stayers (right) based on outcome regressions as introduced in the text. ATT aggregated over the two genders
are presented as ”All”. Aggregated ATT might di↵er slightly from the ATT presented above, due to the additional
equalization of control variables after month -1 through outcome regressions and due to less strict temporal alignment
(instead of computing monthly ATTs and then aggregating over months and years, month and year dummies are used
in the outcome regressions). Confidence bands are based on bootstrapped standard errors, clustered on the individual
level. No confidence bands for the aggregated ATTs are shown to increased readability and since significance of group
di↵erences is of primary interest.
Figure 8: Heterogeneity in ATT based on Earnings in East Germany
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Notes: Results display heterogeneity in ATTs for average daily earnings compared to job changers (left) and stayers
(right) based on outcome regressions as introduced in the text. Heterogeneity here is based on earnings in East Germany
in the month before the treatment month. Individuals which are unemployed one month before treatment are assigned to
the ”No earnings” group. The median of all positive earnings one month before migration is calculated and Individuals
with positive but below median/median earnings are assigned to the ”Below Median” group and individuals with above
median earnings are assigned to the ”Above Median” group. ATT aggregated over the di↵erent income groups are pre-
sented as ”All”. Aggregated ATT might di↵er slightly from the ATT presented above, due to the additional equalization
of control variables after month -1 through outcome regressions and due to less strict temporal alignment (instead of
computing monthly ATTs and then aggregating over months and years, month and year dummies are used in the out-
come regressions). Confidence bands are based on bootstrapped standard errors, clustered on the individual level. No
confidence bands for the aggregated ATTs are shown to increased readability and since significance of group di↵erences
is of primary interest. Since group ATTs are only statistically significantly di↵erent in five months (Month 0,1,19,20
and 21 for Above Median Earnings) when migrants are compared to job changers, and confidence bands are too wide
to allow readability, the confidence bands have been suppressed in the graph on the left and months with significant
di↵erences are marked with a *.
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Figure 9: Di↵erences in earnings with and without RPI
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Notes: Displayed are di↵erences in average daily earnings after population weights and IPW have been applied. Results
without RPI are reestimated, since the sample slightly changed, due to (very few) observations not having information
on the district of work. Results with RPI are computed by first multiplying stayer earnings with the RPI and then
estimating average monthly earnings of stayers after population weights and IPW have been applied. These results are
then divided by the average earnings of stayers after population weights and IPW but without RPI. Earnings are then
divided by these monthly ratios, yielding earnings after application of the RPI. The displayed results are the di↵erences
between earnings of migrants and job changers and stayers respectively.
Figure 10: Results using Di↵erence-in-Di↵erence or Yearly Data
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Notes: DiD results for earnings (left) are based on the Fixed-e↵ect Di↵erence-in-Di↵erence method introduced in the
text and compared to ATT measures obtained through IPW as in Figure 5. Earnings based on yearly data (right) use
the same IPW method as before but now only use information from December instead of information from the whole
year. Migrants are defined as individuals who change the location of their work between December of a specific year and
December the year before. In parallel, job changers are individuals who work for a di↵erent employer compared to one
year before. Stayers or those who remained in their work or remained unemployed compared to the previous December.
Thus migrants who migrated after the previous December but returned before the current December are not counted as
well as job changers who lost their new job already before the current December or stayers who were unemployed in the
previous December, found a job but then lost it again before the current year.
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Figure 11: Monthly Earnings in the GSOEP without (left) and with (right) IPW
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Notes: Both graphs show results for average monthly earnings in the month before the survey interview. Earnings are
based on yearly data, where the interview can be conducted in di↵erent month but mostly in spring/summer. Migrants
are defined as individuals whose stated place of work in the last interview was East Germany and is West Germany in
the subsequent interview. In parallel, job changers are individuals who work for a di↵erent employer compared to one
year before. Stayers or those who remained in their work or remained unemployed compared to the previous interview.
Thus migrants who migrated after the previous interview date but returned before the subsequent interview are not
counted as well as job changers who lost their new job already before the subsequent interview or stayers who were
unemployed at the time of the previous interview, found a job but then lost it again before the subsequent interview.
The graph on the left shows the results for the three groups with population weights but without IPW. The graph on the
right shows results after IPW has been applied. The time unit is years before/after the treatment period (years can last
slightly shorter/longer than 12 months since subsequent interviews are not always conducted in the same month).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Groups
Variable Migrants Stayer Job Changer
Female 35% 55% 50%
Age 39.34 42.15 40.83
Education
High-School Degree 3% 4% 4%
Vocational Training 85% 82% 85%
University Degree 12% 15% 12%
Industry
Agriculture, Energy and Mining 4% 4% 5%
Manufacturing 15% 16% 13%
Construction 22% 12% 17%
Trade, Transport and Communication 13% 12% 12%
Services 30% 34% 32%
Banking and Insurance 10% 7% 10%
Non-commercial Enterprises, Civil Servants 6% 14% 12%
Federal State of Employment (last job)
Berlin 3% 6% 7%
Brandenburg 18% 15% 15%
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 13% 12% 12%
Saxony 28% 34% 32%
Saxony-Anhalt 21% 19% 20%
Thuringia 17% 14% 14%
Share Unemployed 52% 20% 46%
Number of Months
in Unemployment last 12 Months 4.33 2.11 4.27
Number of Job Changes since 1992 2.36 1.59 2.19
Share of months in unemployment
since reunification 21% 14% 21%
Tenure in firm since 1992 in Months 39.84 50.55 36.16
Median Earnings in Firm 55.15 60.22 54.65
Observations 2519 3385419 50817
Notes: Data for Migrants and Job Changers are from 1 month before migration/job change,
for stayers, observations for all time periods are used. Observations are weighted by popu-
lation weights. Civil servants only encompass a subset of all civil servants, since many civil
servants in Germany have a special status (”Beamte”) exempting them from social security
contributions. Thus, they are not included in our data.
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Table 2: Moving Costs
Groups
Migrants Stayer Job Changer
Married 42% 61% 60%
N 99 12281 1320
Number of Children 0.68 0.96 0.87
N 99 12299 1323
Own Property 22% 30% 35%
N 99 12297 1323
Know someone who
moved to the West 30% 34% 32%
N 93 11844 1268
Notes: The displayed sample sizes refer to the number of individuals in the data
that the values are based on. All results are weighted by population weights and
the results for job changers and stayers are reweighted to reflect the distribution of
control variables among migrants. Results refer to the the year before migration/job
change for migrants and job changers. For stayers, each year between 1993 and 2003
is counted.
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Table 3: Behavioural Variables
Groups
Migrants Stayer Job Changer
Risk-aversion 5.09 4.79 4.92
N 80 10038 1029
Attachment to Place of Living
Very Strong 24% 34% 23%
Strong 51% 42% 57%
Weak 22% 21% 18%
None 2% 3% 3%
N 66 6915 829
Conceivable to move away
(job- or family-related)
Yes 55% 22% 20%
Depends 30% 39% 45%
No 15% 39% 36%
N 78 8717 1030
Conceivable to move
to the West
Yes, gladly 15% 3% 5%
Under some circumstances 73% 56% 58%
Rather not 7% 32% 26%
Definitely not 4% 9% 11%
N 63 4091 540
Notes: The displayed sample sizes refer to the number of individuals in the data that the values
are based on. All results are weighted by population weights and the results for job changers and
stayers are reweighted to reflect the distribution of control variables among migrants. Results refer
to the the year before migration/job change for migrants and job changers. For stayers, each year
between 1993 and 2003 is counted.
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Table 4: Expectations and Worries
Groups
Migrants Stayer Job Changer
Optimism about
the future
Definitely 4% 6% 8%
Rather yes 35% 41% 45%
Rather no 56% 45% 36%
Definitely not 5% 8% 11%
N 47 4790 553
Worries own economic
situation
Great Worries 34% 28% 35%
Some Worries 56% 58% 58%
No Worries 10% 13% 7%
N 99 12274 1318
Worries own job
safety
Great Worries 32% 22% 40%
Some Worries 39% 49% 37%
No Worries 29% 29% 23%
N 64 9885 676
Expect voluntary job
search in next 2 years
Surely 29% 6% 25%
Likely 23% 12% 25%
Rather unlikely 18% 36% 17%
Surely not 30% 46% 32%
N 43 6302 428
Expect to lose job
in next 2 years
Surely 12% 9% 9%
Likely 20% 10% 12%
Rather unlikely 39% 60% 53%
Surely not 29% 20% 26%
N 43 6304 429
Notes: The displayed sample sizes refer to the number of individuals in the data
that the values are based on. All results are weighted by population weights and
the results for job changers and stayers are reweighted to reflect the distribution of
control variables among migrants. Results refer to the the year before migration/job
change for migrants and job changers. For stayers, each year between 1993 and 2003
is counted.
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Appendix
A. Dynamic Model
We posit a three period model with periods t=0,1,2. The employment state in period t
while remaining in the East is given by et, with et=1 employed or et=0 unemployed. We
model East-to-West migration at the beginning of period t=1 (m1=1) or period t=2
(m1=0 and m2=1). The model is dynamic such that not migrating in period 1 entails
the possibility to migrate in period 2. No migration is the event m1=0 and m2=0. The
changes in employment while remaining in the East are assumed to follow an exogenous
Markov process. Moving to the West involves finding a job with a fixed wage. This
means that the wage in the West (and also in the East, see below) is una↵ected by
individual employment shocks in the East, which is plausible since a negative labor
demand shock for an individual in East Germany is unlikely to have a strong impact
on labor market chances in West Germany. This assumption seems justified because
the risk of job loss in East Germany is high due to the reunification-caused transition
process, implying that a job loss in East Germany is not viewed as a negative signal
by West German employers. Also note that this is not inconsistent with a positive
cross-sectional correlation between outcomes in the East and in the West because our
theoretical model holds conditional upon observables and unobservables which jointly
a↵ect employment and wages. Further, the qualitative results of the model still hold
as long as labor market prospects in West Germany are less negatively a↵ected by job
loss than labor market prospects in West Germany.
The basic structure of the model is visualized in Figure 12. We consider an individual
who lives in the East in period 0 with given employment state in period 0, e0, forming
the start point in Figure 12. Migration is an absorbing state involving moving to a
job in the West with certain wage wW . Having migrated in period 1 (m1=1, branch
to the left in Figure 12), the individual receives the same wage wW until period 2 (no
employment risk in the West). In contrast, there is a sizeable employment risk in the
East. It is not certain that an unemployed (employed) worker finds a (keeps her) job
in the East the next period (these are the branches in the middle and on the right of
Figure 12 for m1=0 and m2=0). Conditional on being employed (et=1), the wage in
the East in period t is wE and income is zero when unemployed et=0, i.e. the wage is
the additional income when employed.
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Figure 12: Model Visualization
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Define the Markov transition probability ps,t=P (et=1|et 1=s,mt=0) as the prob-
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ability to be employed in the East in period t=1,2, given that the individual has em-
ployment state s in the previous period t 1 and that the individual has not migrated
up until period t (branches in Figure 12 for m1=0 and m2=0). For example, p0,1 is the
probability that an unemployed individual in period 0 is employed in period 1 in the
East given that the individual has not migrated up until period 1. We assume state
dependence in employment such that p1,t>p0,t, i.e. remaining employed is more likely
than finding a job. Individuals form expectations in period t 1, given employment
state s, about their employment probability in period t, pes,t. As a behavioral bias, the
subjective expectation pes,t may di↵er from the objective ps,t.
Migration involves fixed individual costs Ct in the period of migration t=1,2. Ct is
continuously distributed with positive expectation and full support over the real line.
FCt is its distribution function and ft the density, conditional upon not having migrated
by the end of period t 1. C2=C1+✏, where C1 and ✏ are independent random variables
which are also independent of employment and wages, implying positively correlated
costs [Cov(C1,C2)>0].
Total utility for the two time periods, t=1,2, is V (e0)=u1(m1,e1)+u2(m2,e2). ut
is the period specific utility being linear in income and depending upon migration
and employment state. Specifically, u1(m1,e1)=m1 ·(wW C1)+(1 m1)·e1 ·wE, and
u2(m1,m2,e2)=m1wW+(1 m1)(m2(wW C2)+(1 m2)·e2 ·wE). Individuals decide upon
migration at the beginning of period t based on the information in period t 1 without
knowing the period t employment state in the East. We solve the decision problem
backwards. The migration decision in period 2, conditional on not having migrated in
period 1, is based on maximizing
max
{m2}
E(u2(0,m2,e2)|e1)=m2 ·(wW C2)+(1 m2)·pee1,2 ·wE ,
where expectations are taken with respect to the subjective probability pee1,2. Thus, the
individual migrates, if (wW C2)>pee1,2 ·wE, i.e. m⇤2(e1)=1 if C2<wW pee1,2 ·wE and
m⇤2(e1)=0 if C2 wW pee1,2 ·wE. The maximized expected utility for period 2 given e1
and m1=0 is
E(u2(0,m
⇤
2(e1),e2)|e1)=max(wW C2| {z }
m2=1|e1
,pee1,2 ·wE| {z }
m2=1|e1
).
The probability to migrate in period 2 given the information in period 1 isgFC2(e1,C1)⌘
FC2(wW pee1,2 ·wE), where gFC2(e1,C1) is the conditional distribution function of mi-
gration costs C2 given C1 among those not having migrated by the end of period 1.
This probability increases in wW and falls both in wE and in the probability to be
employed in period 2 in the East. Unemployed individuals are more likely to migrate
if employment expectations are lower for the unemployed than for the employed, i.e.
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pe0,2<p
e
1,2. This is likely to be the case given that p0,2<p1,2.
The cost thresholds C2,0=wW pe0,2 ·wE when unemployed in t=1, and C2,1=wW 
pe1,2 ·wE when employed in t=1, are the critical values. With migration costs below
(above) these thresholds, the individual migrates (does not migrate) in period 2. Be-
cause of lower employment chances in the East, it holds that C2,1<C2,0 for the unem-
ployed, who are therefore more likely to migrate.
The migration decision in period 1 involves the decision about migrating now versus
staying with the option to migrate in period 2. The individual maximizes
max
{m1}
E
⇥
m1 ·((wW C1)+wW )+(1 m1)·(e1wE+E(u2(0,m⇤2(e1),e2)|e1,m1=0)|e0)
⇤
=m1 ·(2wW C1)+(1 m1)·
 
pee0,1w
E
+(1 pee0,1)[(1 gFC2(0,C1))pe0,2wE+gFC2(0,C1)(wW E(C2|C2<C2,0))]
+pee0,1[(1 gFC2(1,C1))pe1,2wE+gFC2(1,C1)(wW E(C2|C2<C2,1))]©.
The individual migrates in period 1, i.e.m1=1 i↵ the utility di↵erence between 2wW C1
(wage income in periods 1 and 2 in the West minus migration costs) and the expected
utility when remaining in the East in period 1¶
pee0,1w
E+(1 pee0,1)[(1 F˜C2(0,C1))pe0,2wE+F˜C2(0,C1)(wW E(C2|C2>C2,0))]
+pee0,1[(1 F˜C2(1,C1))pe1,2wE+F˜C2(1,C1)(wW E(C2|C2>C2,1))]
©
is positive. In the subsequent section, we show that the utility di↵erence between
migrating and not migrating in period 1 is a strictly negative function of C1. For C1
going to zero, the individual migrates and for C1 going to infinity the individual does
not migrate. Because the utility di↵erence between migrating and not migrating falls
in C1, there will be a critical threshold C1,e0 depending upon the employment state in
period 0 with (no) migration in period 1 if C1<( )C1,e0 . The probability to migrate
in period 1 is FC1(e0)=P (C1<C1,e0). Analogous to the migration decision in period
2, the threshold - and therefore the migration probability - is higher for non-employed
than for employed, i.e. C1,1<C1,0 and FC1(1)<FC1(0).
There are further important insights to be gained. Since expectations about future
employment matter, the period-1-migration probability falls with better employment
prospects in the East irrespective of the employment situation in period 1. Analogously,
if individuals expect period-2-wages in the East to rise, the expected utility of staying
in the East increases and the migration probability falls. The option-value-of-waiting
hypothesis of Burda (1993, 1995) relies on the anticipation of higher future wages in the
East or on waiting for the uncertainty of migration outcomes in the West to resolve. In
contrast, our model assumes that there is higher employment and income uncertainty
53
in the East. Therefore, the key obstacles to migration are high migration costs and
overly optimistic expectations about labor market chances in the East.
Now, we explain the link between the model and our subsequent empirical analysis
estimating the dynamic returns to migration. In period 2, the migration problem is a
purely static decision without consideration of the future. For all individuals migrating
in period 2 and employment state e1 in period 1, the average return of migration with re-
gard to earnings in period 2 is (wW pe1,2wE). Analogously, the average period-1-income
return to migration in period 1 is (wW pe0,1wE) for individuals with employment state
e0 in period 0.
The counterfactual of period-1-migration in period 2 involves staying in the East
in period 1 with the possibility of migrating in period 2. Thus, the average return in
period 2 becomes
wW pe0,1(F˜C2(1,C1)wW| {z }
m2=1|e1=1
+(1 F˜C2(1,C1))p1,2we)| {z }
m2=0,e2=1|e1=1
 (1 pe0,1)(F˜C2(0,C1)wW| {z }
m2=1|e1=0
+(1 F˜C2(0,C1))p0,2we)| {z }
m2=0,e2=1|e1=0
.
The dynamic counterfactual in period 2 depends upon whether the individual is em-
ployed in period 1, i.e. e1=0,1, migrates in period 2, i.e. m2=0,1, and is employed in
period 2, i.e. e1=0,1, if not migrating.
Finally, a few further remarks on the role of migration costs are in order. Not
migrating in period 1 and migrating in period 2 necessitates that C2 is su ciently low
relative to C1. If migration costs do not change, i.e. C2=C1, and individuals perfectly
predict future employment probabilities, then migration in period 2 is low. Everybody
with migration costs below C2,1 has already migrated in period 1. In fact, depending
on the parameters of the decision problem, there may even be no migration in period 2.
The only migrants we would possibly observe in period 2 would be individuals who are
employed in period 0, who are not employed in period 1, and for whom C2,1<C2<C2,0.
Migration in period 2 is higher, if random migration costs in period 2, C2, are lower
than C1 for some of those not migrating in period 1 or if individuals overestimate
future employment probabilities based on the information in period 0 or in period 1.
Thus, changing non-monetary migration costs or biased expectations provide behavioral
explanations for delaying migration.
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A.1 Proof for the negative influence of C1
We need to show that the utility di↵erence between migrating and not migrating in
period 1 is a strictly negative function of C1. To do so, we prove below that
@
î
(1 F˜C2(e1,C1))pee1,2wE+F˜C2(e1,C1)(wW E(C2|C2>C2,e1))
ó
@C1
= F˜C2(e1,C1).(4)
The right-hand-side of equation (4) lies strictly between -1 and 0. Thus, the utility
di↵erence between migrating and not migrating in period 1 is a strictly negative function
of C1, because @(2wW C1)/@C1= 1 and the derivative for the expected utility when
staying in the East lies strictly between -1 and 0. The latter follows because the
derivatives of the two terms in brackets lie between -1 and 0 and the utility di↵erence
involves a convex combination of the two terms.
Proof of equation (4):
(1 F˜C2(e1,C1))pee1,2wE+F˜C2(e1,C1)(wW E(C2|C2>C2,e1))
=
Z C2,e1
 1
(wW C2)f(C2|C1)dC2+
Z 1
C2,e1
pee1,2w
Ef(C2|C1)dC2
=
Z C2,e1
 1
(wW C2 pee1,2wE)f(C2|C1)dC2+pee1,2wE
Z 1
 1
f(C2|C1)dC2
=
Z C2,e1
 1
(C2,e1 C2)f(C2|C1)dC2+pee1,2wE
because C2,e1=w
W pee1,2wE. The second term in the sum does not depend upon C1.
The first term can be written as
Z C2,e1
 1
(C2,e1 C2)f(C2|C1)dC2
=
Z C2,e1 C1
 1
(C2,e1 C1 C¯)f0(C¯)dC¯ ,
where we substitute C¯=C2 C1 and use the fact that f0(C¯) is the pdf of ✏ which does
not depend upon C1. Rewrite this expression as
(C2,e1 C1)
Z C2,e1 C1
 1
f0(C¯)dC¯ 
Z C2,e1 C1
 1
C¯f0(C¯)dC¯
=(C2,e1 C1)F˜C2(e1,C1) 
Z C2,e1 C1
 1
C¯f0(C¯)dC¯.
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Note that f0(C¯) is the density of the distribution function F0(C¯). Further, it holds that
F˜C2(e1,C1)=F0(C2,e1 C1). Now consider the first derivative with respect to C1 (using
Leibniz rule for the second term)
@
î
(C2,e1 C1)F˜C2(e1,C1) 
R C2,e1 C1
 1 C¯f0(C¯)dC¯
ó
@C1
= F˜C2(e1,C1) (C2,e1 C1)f0(C2,e1 C1)+(C2,e1 C1)f0(C2,e1 C1)= F˜C2(e1,C1)
which completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
B. Temporal Alignment and IPW
Job changers
We start with the migration-vs-job-change treatment to describe the temporal align-
ment and reweighting, which is particularly important because of the strong pre-
migration dip in earnings and employment shortly before migration/job change. We
need to balance on the one hand calendar time to ensure comparability in economic con-
ditions and on the other hand time until treatment because of the dip before treatment.
Since the pre-treatment dip involves a large change during a few months and we allow
for calendar time controls, we align exactly based on the number of months until/since
migration and we contrast migrants and job changers treated in the same calendar year.
This means that the individual observations used to compute the monthly averages by
time relative to treatment stem from di↵erent calendar months. We estimate returns
to migration for earnings and employment, i.e. monthly means of daily earnings and
employment rates are compared across the di↵erent groups. Figure 13 illustrates the
approach for an example.
Figure 13: Migration Cohort 1994 - Pre-migration Temporal Alignment
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For six individuals in the 1994 migration cohort, the graph to the left shows the
timing of migration and job change, respectively. Individuals 1 to 3 are migrants and
their pre-migration spells are completed in the month before migration (when the line
ends). Correspondingly, the lines for the job changers 4 to 6 end in the month be-
fore job change. Temporal alignment by calendar month (vertical lines) would imply
that migrants and job changers would be compared at di↵erent points durations un-
til treatment. In contrast, we align by duration until treatment, which allows us to
trace the pre-treatment dip in earnings and employment, as shown in the graph to the
right. Using the alignment in the graph to the right, we then estimate the ATT JC(a)
of migration-vs-job-change by contrasting the mean outcomes (after IPW to control for
di↵erences in observables) for each month a, i.e. separately for a= 24,...,24 before/after
the date of migration/job change.
To take account of changes in the di↵erences between migrants and job changers
based on calendar time, each ATT JC(a) is a weighted average of yearly ATT’s based
on the migration cohorts by calendar years. This means that ATT JC(a) is estimated
separately for each migration cohort from 1994 to 2004. Furthermore, the migration
cohort specific ATT JC(a) is itself a weighted average of the ATT JC(a) by calendar
month of migration. For migrants in a specific calendar month, the comparison for
month a relative to treatment includes job changers also a month before/after job
change in the same calendar month. To obtain the migration cohort specific ATT JC(a),
we calculate a weighted average of the calendar month specific ATTs, using the share of
migrants in this specific month relative to the total amount of migrants in this cohort.
Figure 14 visualizes this approach for the ATT JC( 1) and ATT JC( 2) based on the
1994 migrant cohort.
Figure 14: ATT JC( 1) and ATT JC( 2) for Migration Cohort 1994
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The graph to the left shows the relevant 12-months window for the computation
of ATT JC,c(a) for a= 1 (c=1994 represents the migration cohort 1994), one month
before migration, and the distribution of migrants across the 12-months window. The
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graph to the right considers the same for a= 2. For each calendar month, a separate
ATT JC,cm (a) is computed and then weighted by the share of migrants in this month
relative to all migrants in migration cohort 1994. Thus, the overall ATT JC(a) can be
formally expressed as ATT JC(a)=
2004P
c=1994
kc(
P12
m=1s
c
mATT
JC,c
m (a)), where kc is the share
of migrants in cohort c relative to the overall number of migrants, and scm is the share
of migrants from cohort c in month m of the moving 12-months window relative to all
migrants from cohort c in this 12-months window.
In addition to temporal alignment, IPW is used to balance the observable charac-
teristics between job changers and migrants. Since we estimate the average treatment
e↵ect on the treated, migrants get a weight of 1 and we reweight job changers such that
the distribution of observable characteristics mimics the one among migrants. To ob-
tain the weights for job changers, we estimate a logit model with the migration dummy
as dependent variable and the covariates as observed one month before migration or
job change as control variables. The estimated propensity scores, pˆ(Xi), are used to
compute the normalized weights for the control group using the following formula
wˆcj,m=
pˆ(Xj)
1 pˆ(Xj)P
i2Na
(1 Ti) pˆ(Xi)1 pˆ(Xi)
where Ti is an indicator which is equal to 1 (0) if individual i is a migrant (a job changer)
and Na are all individuals observed a periods before/after migration/job change. Indi-
viduals with too large weights are discarded from the computation of the ATT, based
on the method described in Huber et al. (2013). The ATT JC,cm can then be expressed as
1P
i2NaTi
P
i2Mcm(a)
yi 
P
j2JCcm(a)
wˆcj,m ·yj, where M cm(a) are all migrants in cohort c in month
m observed a months before/since migration, JCcm(a) is defined analogously for job
changers, and yi/j is the outcome considered (earnings, employment).
Stayers
The temporal alignment and reweighting procedure is more complex for ATT Stay. Stay-
ers do not experience a specific event (like a job change) in a specific year and, on aver-
age, stayers do not show the typical pre-treatment dip as migrants or job changers do.
Thus, for a stayer, every individual observation from the relevant period of 12 months
could be used as the counterfactual for the outcome of migrants one month before
treatment. Therefore, when determining the mean earnings of stayers for say month
-1 of the 1994 migration cohort, we use all twelve observations from December 1993
to November 1994. We also do this for the estimation of IPW weights. For migrants,
only one individual observation is used, namely the one from the month -1. The 12
individual observations of a stayer will get di↵erent weights if the control variables for
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a stayer changes over the course of the 12 months. Table 5 shows the shift of weights
for an individual stayer for the relevant 12 months of the migration cohort in 1994 for
months -1 and -2 prior to migration. Our method is equivalent to replicating each stayer
12 times for the 12 potential “treatment” months (for which a is set to 0) January to
December 1994.
Table 5: Weight-Shifting for Stayers
Cohorts
Month Year Weights for Month -1 Weights for Month -2 Earnings
October 1993 . . 1250
November 1993 . 0.02 1250
December 1993 0.02 0.04 1250
January 1994 0.04 0.01 1250
February 1994 0.01 0.11 1250
March 1994 0.11 0.04 1370
April 1994 0.04 0.03 1370
May 1994 0.03 0.07 1370
June 1994 0.07 0.08 1370
July 1994 0.08 0.07 1410
August 1994 0.07 0.07 1410
September 1994 0.07 0.09 1410
October 1994 0.09 0.04 1410
November 1994 0.04 . 1410
December 1994 . . 1410
Notes: The table displays the weighting scheme for an individual stayer which is used as part of the control group
for migration cohort 1994. Weights are determined based on logistic regression with an migration/stayer indicator
as dependent variable. Since every month between Jan and December could be a potential treatment month, all
month between December 1993 - November 1994 can be used as control obersvations for the month before migration
for migrants. This is represented in column ”Weights for Month -1”. It follows that all month between November
1993 and October 1994 can be used as control observations for month -2. Since weights are held constant for
each potential treatment month, weights are shifted one month back as show in column ”Weights for Month -2”.
Earnings are displayed to illustrate that the di↵erent monthly weights matter, if the earnings of a stayer change
during the moving 12-months window.
To determine mean earnings of stayers, the same method as for job changers is
employed to align the distribution of stayers with that of migrants. The only di↵erence
is that for each monthly average, observations from all stayers are used (instead of
only the observations for job changers for whom the calendar month corresponds to the
specific month before/after job change for which the mean earnings are computed).
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C. Tables
Table 6: Logit Models of Migration
Reference Group Job Changers Stayer
Female -0.5156*** -0.6497***
(-7.4) (-9.69)
Age 0.0249 0.1267***
(0.95) (5.03)
Age2 -0.0006* -0.002***
(-1.86) (-6.57)
Tenure in Industry of last Job 0.0013 -0.0031***
(1.19) (-2.73)
Tenure in current firm (unemployed = 0) 0.0019** 0.0004
(2.48) (0.4)
Months in unemployment last 12 months 0.0102 0.0492
(0.3) (1.48)
Months in continuous unemployment 0.0059 -0.0044
(1.03) (-0.7)
Number of job changes since 1992 0.0221 1.3384***
(0.23) (15.6)
Share in non-employment since 1990 -0.0097 0.0131
(-0.29) (0.42)
Population in county of last job -0.0755 -0.1203
(-0.82) (-1.32)
Employment rate in county of last job 0.0013 0.0071
(0.25) (1.38)
Mean earnings potential in county of last job 0.0226*** 0.0251***
(3.84) (4.37)
Distance to Western border of county of last job -0.0023*** -0.002***
(-3.27) (-2.88)
Number of Employees in last firm -0.0282* -0.072***
(-1.81) (-4.68)
Median Earnings in last firm 0.0039** 0.0021
(2.13) (1.12)
Labor earnings 0.0033 -0.0078***
(1.43) (-3.29)
Unemployed 0.3331 1.4496
(2.22) (9.33)
Education
High School -0.0532 -0.1376
(-0.37) (-0.98)
Vocational Training (Base) . .
University 0.0955 0.1344
(1.02) (1.5)
Notes: Results for job changers stem from a logistic regression on an indicator for migration or job chang-
ing. Observations stem from the month before migration/job change and from all sample years. Results
for job changers stem from a logistic regression on an indicator for migration or staying. Observations for
stem from the month before migration, for stayers all observations from all sample cohorts are used. These
are thus aggregate results over all migration cohorts, in contrast to results used for the estimation of IPW
where separate logistic regressions are estimate for each migration cohort. Additional controls used in the
estimation of IPW but not displayed here to increase readability: dummies for the industry of the last job,
dummies for the occupation, dummies for the federal state where the last job was located, dummies for the
calendar month and retrospective values for the months 6, 12 and 24 before migration for the some of the
labor market indicators. The logistic regression uses population weights.
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Table 7: Means of Control Variables before and after IPW (BASiD)
Groups
Stayer Job Changer
Migrants No IPW IPW No IPW IPW
Female (%) 35.44 55.29 35.19 49.94 35.27
Age 39.34 42.15 39.48 40.83 39.46
Age2 1619.21 1858.83 1629.96 1745.55 1628.53
Tenure in Industry of last Job 47.42 61.34 47.62 44.14 47.53
Tenure in current firm (unemployed = 0) 39.84 50.55 39.56 36.16 39.62
Months in unemployment last 12 months 4.33 2.11 4.39 4.27 4.4
Months in continuous unemployment 7.41 3.94 7.57 6.41 7.51
Number of job changes since 1992 2.36 1.59 2.4 2.19 2.39
Share in unemployment since 1990 20.74 14.3 20.69 21.1 20.69
Earnings 30.71 52.92 30.75 32.68 30.54
Unemployment 51.95 19.72 52.16 46.27 52.32
Characteristics of County of Last Job
Population in county of last job 12.23 12.37 12.22 12.39 12.22
Employment rate in county of last job 61.79 61.69 61.53 62.49 61.56
Mean earnings potential in county of last job 56.69 56.66 56.88 55.93 56.82
Distance to Western border of county of last job 106.69 111.37 107.06 113.46 107.36
Characteristics of Last Firm
Number of Employees in last firm 3.71 4.3 3.69 4.04 3.69
Median Earnings in last firm 55.15 60.22 55.36 54.65 55.28
Education (%)
High School 3.11 3.05 3.05 3.67 3.11
Apprenticeship 84.69 84.65 84.65 81.76 84.64
University 12.21 12.3 12.3 14.57 12.26
Federal State of Last Job (%)
Berlin 3.53 3.42 3.42 5.96 3.51
Brandenburg 18.66 17.95 17.95 15.22 18.57
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 13.53 13.3 13.3 11.89 13.54
Saxony 27 27.72 27.72 33.66 27.04
Saxony-Anhalt 20.95 21.07 21.07 18.87 20.92
Thuringia 16.33 16.54 16.54 14.4 16.42
Industry in Last Job (%)
Agriculture, Energy and Mining 3.85 3.87 3.87 4.45 3.83
Manufacturing 15.02 15.17 15.17 15.82 14.85
Construction 22.55 22.46 22.46 12.48 22.6
Trade, Transport and Communication 12.95 13.03 13.03 11.52 13.01
Services 30.04 29.66 29.66 34.17 30
Banking and Insurance 9.98 10.1 10.1 7.32 10.08
Non-commercial Enterprises, Civil Servants 5.6 5.71 5.71 14.24 5.63
Occupation in Last Job (%)
Agriculture 2.77 3.42 2.87 4.34 2.89
Resource Extraction and Production 20.29 19.46 19.98 19.02 20.05
Construction, Architecture 20.87 9.93 21.14 14.61 20.96
Science, Media, Art, Culture 2.41 2.54 2.29 2.08 2.36
Tra c, Logistics, Security 16.62 12.61 16.62 15.47 16.47
Sales 10.37 8.4 10.17 9.01 10.25
Management, Accounting, Law, Administration 14.84 22.82 14.77 18.95 14.75
Health, Social, Education 8.54 17.68 8.83 11.85 8.88
Unskilled Worker 3.28 3.15 3.32 4.67 3.39
Notes: Descriptive Statistics for the variables, except for the earnings measures, are computed here as an average
over all di↵erent calendar month, unlike in the estimation of returns. Observations for migrants and the ”No IPW”
category are weighted by population weights. For the ”IPW” category, IPW are additionally used. For the earnings
measure, first averaging over returns in a calendar month and then over all of the month in the year (weighted by
the distribution of migrants across the year) and then aggregation over all years is used as described in the text.
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Table 8: Means of Moving Costs and Behavioral Variables before and after IPW -
GSOEP
No IPW IPW
Migrants Stayer JC Stayer JC
Married 42% 73% 66% 61% 60%
Number of Children 0.68 0.65 0.78 0.96 0.87
Own Property 22% 39% 37% 30% 35%
Know someone who
moved to the West 30% 29% 33% 34% 32%
Risk Aversion 5.09 4.5 4.71 4.79 4.92
Attachment to
Place of Living
Very Strong 24% 31% 31% 34% 23%
Strong 51% 53% 51% 42% 57%
Weak 22% 14% 15% 21% 18%
None 2% 2% 2% 3% 3%
Conceivable to move away
(job- or family-related)
Yes 55% 15% 16% 22% 20%
Depends 30% 33% 37% 39% 45%
No 15% 52% 48% 39% 36%
Conceivable to move
to the West
Yes, gladly 15% 3% 4% 3% 5%
Under some circumstances 73% 58% 55% 56% 58%
Rather not 7% 30% 32% 32% 26%
Definitely not 4% 8% 8% 9% 11%
Notes: The displayed sample sizes refer to the number of individuals in the data that the values
are based on. Results with ”No IPW” are weighted by population weights and the results for job
changers and stayers ”With IPW” are additionally reweighted to reflect the distribution of control
variables among migrants using IPW. Results refer to the the year before migration/job change for
migrants and job changers. For stayers, each year between 1993 and 2003 is counted.
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Table 9: Means of Expectations and Worries before and after IPW - GSOEP
No IPW IPW
Migrants Stayer JC Stayer JC
Worries own economic
situation
Great Worries 34% 27% 43% 28% 35%
Some Worries 56% 60% 51% 58% 58%
No Worries 10% 13% 6% 13% 7%
Worries own job
safety
Great Worries 32% 23% 36% 22% 40%
Some Worries 39% 50% 46% 49% 37%
No Worries 29% 27% 18% 29% 23%
Expect voluntary job
search in next 2 years
Surely not 30% 55% 26% 46% 32%
Rather unlikely 18% 31% 33% 36% 17%
Likely 23% 9% 23% 12% 25%
Surely 29% 4% 18% 6% 25%
Expect to lose job
in next 2 years
Surely not 29% 24% 15% 20% 26%
Rather unlikely 39% 58% 51% 60% 53%
Likely 20% 12% 18% 10% 12%
Surely 12% 5% 16% 9% 9%
Notes: The displayed sample sizes refer to the number of individuals in the data that the values
are based on. Results with ”No IPW” are weighted by population weights and the results for job
changers and stayers ”With IPW” are additionally reweighted to reflect the distribution of control
variables among migrants using IPW. Results refer to the the year before migration/job change for
migrants and job changers. For stayers, each year between 1993 and 2003 is counted.
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Table 10: Locational Attachment and Willingness to Move Years -4 to -2
Groups
Migrants Stayer Job Changer
Attachment to Place of Living
Very Strong 27% 34% 26%
Strong 46% 46% 56%
Weak 23% 17% 14%
None 3% 3% 3%
N 153 15940 1900
Conceivable to move away
(job- or family-related)
Yes 38% 22% 22%
Depends 44% 43% 41%
No 17% 35% 37%
N 213 24570 2882
Conceivable to move
to the West
Yes, gladly 12% 3% 3%
Under some circumstances 66% 60% 70%
Rather not 13% 29% 22%
Definitely not 8% 7% 4%
N 151 9102 1200
Notes: The displayed sample sizes refer to the number of individuals in the data that the values are
based on. All results are weighted by population weights and the results for job changers and stayers
are reweighted to reflect the distribution of control variables among migrants. Results refer to the
the years 2 to 4 years before migration/job change for migrants and job changers. For stayers,
each year between 1994 and 2004 is counted can be the potential treatment year. So each stayer is
replecated virtually 10 times and for each of these stayers the results from 2 to 4 years before the
hypothetical treatment time are counted if available.
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Table 11: Expectations and Worries, Years -4 to -2
Groups
Migrants Stayer Job Changer
Optimism about
the future
Definitely 9% 8% 10%
Rather yes 52% 58% 44%
Rather no 32% 32% 36%
Definitely not 7% 12% 11%
N 106 10709 1256
Worries own economic
situation
Great Worries 36% 31% 31%
Some Worries 50% 57% 58%
No Worries 14% 11% 10%
N 291 36483 3904
Worries own job
safety
Great Worries 31% 22% 29%
Some Worries 52% 52% 51%
No Worries 16% 26% 20%
N 164 26968 1730
Expect voluntary job
search in next 2 years
Surely not 26% 37% 27%
Rather unlikely 35% 37% 47%
Likely 22% 17% 16%
Surely 17% 8% 11%
N 81 12113 850
Expect to lose job
in next 2 years
Surely not 16% 13% 14%
Rather unlikely 54% 62% 64%
Likely 27% 18% 18%
Surely 3% 7% 4%
N 81 12127 853
Notes: The displayed sample sizes refer to the number of individuals in the data
that the values are based on. All results are weighted by population weights and the
results for job changers and stayers are reweighted to reflect the distribution of control
variables among migrants. Results refer to the the years 2 - 4 before migration/job
change for migrants and job changers. For stayers, each year between 1994 and
2004 is counted can be the potential treatment year. So each stayer is replecated
virtually 10 times and for each of these stayers the results from 2 to 4 years before
the hypothetical treatment time are counted if available.
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D. Figures
Figure 15: Earnings and Unemployment after IPW by treatment year
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Notes: Graphs show the average daily earnings for the three treatment groups, after IPW has been applied. The di↵erence
to the aggregate results in the text is that cohort-specific ATTs are not aggregated and reweighted based on the share
of migrants in each cohort relative to all migrants, but that results for each cohort are displayed separately. As for
the aggregate results, IPW are estimated separately for every migration cohort. Displayed years refer to the year of
migration (the migration cohort) and results are displayed for the 24 month before and after the time of treatment.
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